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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
EXPLORING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCES 
ON EPISTEMIC BELIEFS 
This document proceeds from an interest in applying theories of student 
development to higher education policy.  The process sobered me from idealistic 
expectations of profundity to focus on adding relevant building blocks to the established 
foundation of epistemological development.  Progress was found in moving toward 
clarifying what happens during the change process as a student moves from naïve to 
mature beliefs.  Lead forth out of this ambiguity, unearthing the nature of social 
influences as a player in the developmental process became a target of this work. 
Moving toward a deeper understanding of how concepts of attachment, naiveté, 
authority, and potential loss interface with epistemological development are at the core of 
this enterprise.  The following is a quantitative analysis using a self-report survey to 
explore the interaction between social influences and the development of epistemological 
beliefs.  The methodology uses students’ impressions of themselves to create a factor 
structure based on theory from previous research.  The emerging limitations are both 
related to student perspective and the enigmatic nature of developmental measurement.  
The resulting claims keep these limitations in view with an eye toward conclusions that 
relate to defining factors.  For example, the nature of authority was found to fit better as a 
source of knowledge rather than a social influence.  Also, the factor of Social Accord 
emerged as a consistent influence on development.   
The results show that social influences and the development of epistemic beliefs 
are negatively related and the statistical significance of the analysis suggests the value of 
further exploration into the relationship between the two constructs.  However, even more 
clarity is needed to accurately define epistemic beliefs, how they could be best measured 
quantitatively, and how social influences are composed.  This project is a step along that 
building process. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Simply look out a high-rise window of a professor’s office and you will see the 
emphasis on building across campus.  Torn up roads and demolished residence halls are 
the evidence of progress.  Buildings that housed memories of the wonder years of 
professional women and men across our state and world are now piles of rubble.  In the 
competitive world of higher education, there is no doubt that a plan for the future is 
necessary.  Student retention and recruitment are high priorities, so state of the art 
renovation is happening for good reason.  A local radio ad boasts that a new freshmen 
class is the largest and most accomplished to date.  Growth mingles with the dust in the 
air outside the windows. 
Less obvious, in underpublicized meetings among campus leaders, discussions 
about increasing the quality of education are also taking place.  This campus, along with 
most others across the United States, has a mission statement that includes a declaration 
for the need to graduate critical thinkers.  The benefits of buildings can be measured by 
bottom lines and their features can be explained to students anticipating the joys of 
college life.  More abstractly, educational theory can illustrate the need for solid 
evaluation leading toward the cognitive advancement of students. 
This is the background of epistemological study for higher education, which 
examines the way beliefs about knowledge influence opinion, acquisition, and 
justification.  It can help educational strategists become more mindful of what kinds of 
cognitive foundations are being established.  As a parent with a child soon to become a 
college student, I am one of many interested in knowing how my child, and the peers she 
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will interact with, will be cognitively challenged on her campus.  Parents, professors and 
administrators alike can all benefit from guidance in navigating discussions about how 
cognitive development can influence curriculums and pedagogies.  Studies about 
epistemology have attempted to contribute to these discussions.  Despite such attempts, 
epistemology continues to be enigmatic.   Increased efforts need to be made into 
analyzing how epistemic beliefs are developed, tracked and measured.  While defining 
the boundaries of development can be challenging, discussing how cognitive and 
epistemological development can be measured will start conversations that lead to 
strategies about building more qualified graduates, thus meeting university missions.  
This study is an exploratory attempt to start such a conversation by unpacking the 
tradition of measurement of educational epistemological development. 
As a five-year graduate assistant in residence life, I know first-hand that social 
gatherings, chance meetings at orientation sessions, and classroom laughter fill the 
imaginations of incoming students.  The university is indeed building buildings, but it is 
also shaping minds and serving as an environment for forming relationships.  Measuring 
cognitive growth would be much simpler in a social vacuum.  Epistemological 
developmental studies have begun to unearth contextual effects on growth, change, and 
the way doubt is managed (Baxter Magolda, 2004; Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Pizzolato, 
2005; Pizzolato, Ngyuen, Johnston, & Wang, 2012).  Continued discussion about how 
developmental processes operate within social realms needs to progress.  Examining the 
processes of interaction between epistemological growth and social context is the primary 
goal of this study. 
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After investigating multiple theories on college student development, primarily 
originating from the landmark work of William Perry (1970), I found that researchers 
continually called for more detailed investigations into the process of cognitive change.  
However, while epistemological development is related to cognitive development, there 
are some differences.  One of significance is that epistemology, because it deals more 
directly with specific beliefs, lends itself more to a detailed analysis of the change 
process.  The construct of personal epistemology has consistently included beliefs about 
(a) the certainty of knowledge, (b) the simplicity of knowledge, (c) the source of 
knowledge, and (d) the justifications for knowing (Pintrich, 2002).  This study is an 
attempt to explore that foundation and clarify the way in which social influences are 
involved in epistemological development.  A further goal is to situate epistemology 
within the broader field of cognitive development.  While both developmental processes 
are generally described as moving from subjective to increasingly more objective 
viewpoints, epistemology can more easily be framed to describe and analyze particular 
beliefs about knowledge and therefore what specifically occurs during change.  
Furthermore, epistemological development has been more thoroughly qualitatively than 
quantitatively tested.  While qualitative measures have proven to be more helpful in 
determining the nuances of development, particularly for measuring broad shifts, they 
lack the detail required to outline specific change processes.  A definitive, reliable, 
quantitative measure still eludes researchers.   
Some studies have exposed the tenuous nature of epistemological constructs 
(Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002; Welch & Ray, 2013; Wheeler, 2007).  The role of 
social interaction has added to the confusion.  Exploring the ways social, environmental 
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forces like authority, relational attachment and fear of loss influence epistemological 
development may clarify more measurable aspects of epistemic beliefs.  These particular 
social influences, which have more clearly emerged in the literature as potential factors in 
development, will be examined through a quantitative measure to test and verify ways in 
which socially created predispositions toward knowledge inhibit or promote 
epistemological change.  The nature of the existence of these social influences and their 
affect on epistemic growth will be examined to help refine measurement strategies, which 
is a necessary foundational step that can reveal eventual applications for higher 
education. 
Statement of the Problem 
Various factor analyses of epistemic beliefs have yet to produce a strong 
measurement device of the constructs of epistemology (Welch & Ray, 2013).  Marlene 
Schommer’s (1990) initial Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) has been shaped and 
reshaped because it was difficult to replicate her results.  New forms of the questionnaire 
have also failed to produce consistent confidence for quantitative measurement.  The 
construct has been adjusted, offering better results, but it continues to produce less than 
desirable levels of reliability. 
Researchers are also calling for a clearer understanding of the details of the 
change process.  This is a continually evolving practice of bringing clarity to a somewhat 
nebulous concept.  The assessment of social influences as important drivers or inhibiters 
of the process may provide a step toward a more accurate understanding of 
epistemological development. 
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Purpose of the Study 
Most higher education institutions claim to enhance the growth of students as 
critical thinkers.  A more readily reproducible measure of epistemological beliefs is 
needed to explore the relationship between epistemology and learning, particularly as it 
pertains to college students.  The construct of epistemology is becoming more useful for 
evaluating educational processes, and this study hopes to explore possible ways to assist 
in validating it through responsible measurement.  Social elements have continued to 
skew the results of these measurements.  Providing a theoretical foundation that adds to 
the explanation of the effects of social influences, operationalizing them and measuring 
them separately for analysis are the purposes of this study.  With a valid measurement of 
the impact of social influences on beliefs and greater insight into factors that influence 
development, epistemology can be more usefully applied to higher education. 
Research Question 
The material presented focuses upon the following research question:  To what 
extent does a measure of authority, naïveté of attachment, and fear of loss as a result of 
change amongst college students help predict their level of epistemological development? 
Theoretical Framework 
This study emerged from explorations of cognitive development theory and 
epistemological development theory.  Both processes were examined in depth to 
determine their relationship to each other.  In particular, the way each describes change 
factors heavily in operationalizing the impact of social influences.  The bioecological 
model (Bronfenbrenner, 1994) will also be examined as an alternative because of its 
useful definitions of the contextual processes active in development.  As a result, the 
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theoretical framework of the study is centered on development, and change in particular, 
because it exposes the social factors involved in the process. 
The literature also calls for more valid measurement because factor analyses from 
previous studies revealed that some epistemological beliefs “fell out” as aspects of the 
overall construct.  Reshaping an overall construct of epistemic beliefs, while considering 
social influences, allows for the associations between the two to be explored.  A 
quantitative measure of beliefs and subsequently, social influences, permits a factor 
analysis to determine the latent factors involved.  These can then be examined to 
determine how specific interactions between them might mediate change.  The history of 
quantitative measures of epistemological beliefs reveals clues about the best way to shape 
a theoretical construct of epistemic beliefs and social influences. 
Epistemology as a modern concept has existed for over a century and ultimately 
dates back to ancient Greece.  In 1854, James Frederick Ferrier first mentions the modern 
term in his work, Institutes of Metaphysic.  Over time, the word has become 
interchangeable with the theory of knowledge.  It encapsulates various philosophical 
fields such as justification, meta-philosophy, the structure of knowledge, and skepticism 
just to name a few.  Insights emerging from epistemology have been applied to multiple 
fields including politics, aesthetics, and ethics, for example.  The current study narrows 
the topic to explore ideas surrounding the development of epistemic beliefs of college 
students.  As a result, epistemology is framed here to more directly explore conceptual 
change; and this quite apart from discussions about particular beliefs.  The resulting 
analysis is targeted to bring eventual insight into higher education applications. 
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The way both the cognitive and epistemological developmental fields describe 
change reveals subtle, but important differences.  While it is not the only way to see the 
relationship between the two sciences, cognitive development can be framed as a broader 
developmental process, and epistemological development as the evolution of specific 
beliefs about knowledge.  Cognitive development theory uses the term dissonance to 
name the key factor in development while epistemological development employs doubt.  
Taking the ideas behind these terms further, epistemological change as initiated by doubt 
suggests there are social determinants are involved in the epistemological growth process. 
Robert Kegan (1994) articulately captures the nature of cognitive growth and his 
theories have been appropriately applied to educational practice.  His ideas form a 
coherent model for cognitive development and therefore provide a background for the 
study.  His terminology describes growth as the mind’s differentiation of itself from 
former perceptions. These differentiations form the basis for analyzing change. 
Early researchers of cognitive and epistemological development contribute key 
concepts to the study.  Thinkers such as William Perry (1970), Marlene Schommer 
(1990), Urie Bronfenbrenner (1994), Marcia Baxter Magolda (2004), Jane Pizzolato 
(2005), and others have provided a comprehensive language for discussing change, 
particularly as it reveals the significance of context as a factor. 
The evolution of quantitative research for epistemology has contributed heavily to 
the emergence of social relationships as a factor in development.  Marlene Schommer 
(1990) was the first theorist to produce a device specifically designed to measure 
epistemological beliefs. Unlike other researchers in the field, she wasn’t convinced that 
interviews were the best way to measure epistemological beliefs, so she developed and 
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continually operationalized the Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ).  Her five categories 
of beliefs established a construct that has been modified as other researchers examined 
her work.  Resulting quantitative devices, such as the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory 
(EBI) in particular (Schraw et al., 2002), have shaped different aspects of the construct as 
they wrestled to reproduce Schommer’s results.  Various researchers have conducted 
factor analyses to determine an acceptable construct and measuring device for 
epistemological beliefs.  Some measured aspects of epistemic beliefs did not replicate 
well and these limitations have continued to direct an overall, evolving study.  These 
categories share a common thread, namely they are social in nature and converge in a 
general disposition toward change.  Such categories will be used to operationalize social 
influences factors. 
One of the only clear epistemological change models was catalogued by Lisa 
Bendixen and Deanna Rule (2004).  They took theories, particularly from Barbara Hofer 
and Paul Pintrich (1997), and created a model that describes epistemic change with the 
components epistemic doubt, epistemic volition, and resolution strategies.  This epistemic 
change model exposes the way in which social influences interact with general 
development.  Hofer (2001), one of the leading theorists on epistemology, claims that 
development can be viewed from a global perspective – that people hold a general, over-
arching approach to knowledge that is on a continuum from subjectivity to objectivity.  
She outlines how most research has examined epistemology from this perspective, but 
introduces insights that challenge previous understandings and inspires succeeding 
studies, suggesting that there are more “fine-grained” elements to be explored.  Following 
Hofer’s influence, David Hammer and Andrew Elby’s study (2002) suggests the 
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existence of “epistemological resources,” claiming that development is more context 
driven.  In this sense, general epistemological schemes are composed of smaller 
groupings of perspectives shaped by resources.  The nature of social influence can be 
defined, in part, by examining how these resources operate within a context. 
To explore the significance of social, environmental factors, Bronfenbrenner’s 
work on the bioecological model of development will be presented to gain insight into 
factors influencing the development of epistemic beliefs.  His work lends itself to 
considering relationships as an ecological configuration of cultural influence.  His model 
helps to reveal factors influencing developing epistemic beliefs and offers an alternative 
view on how they change as a student develops. 
A study by David Long, Evolution and Religion in American Education: An 
Ethnography (2011), exposed the dynamic relationships between the origins of beliefs, 
epistemology and social relationships.  Through extensive interviews with students, 
teachers, and professors, Long discovered that the teaching of evolution in high schools 
and colleges was being influenced by cultural maxims.  After delineating particular 
ontological outlooks, he revealed the relationship between evolution education and 
ontological, epistemic perspectives, portending that a student’s origin of beliefs trumps or 
motivates epistemology.  Framed in this way, social influence can be described as a force 
that limits or encourages epistemic growth. 
Significance of the Study 
The present study examines the ways proposed social factors influence 
epistemological development.  This is important because such an analysis may contribute 
to discovering ways epistemic beliefs operate within social contexts at universities and 
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colleges.  Specifically, the way authority, naiveté of attachment, and fear of loss 
influence epistemic change may help improve our understanding of significant and 
desirable epistemic changes among college students. 
The formation of constructs and their relationships with each other.  This 
study is, in part, an attempt to clarify what encompasses epistemology and social 
influences.  Before discussions about developmental change can take place, it is 
important to know what aspects of knowledge students are wrestling with.  While 
researchers have begun to provide key arguments about what is taking place during 
epistemological development, few have been able to clearly define exactly what happens 
as students mature.  In order to enter into discussion about how epistemology can be 
applied toward improvements in education, more needs to be known about the change 
process.  Additionally, the theoretical framework provided allows a starting point for 
discussion about how the social contexts of students may influence the development of 
epistemic beliefs.  Moving from theoretical concepts to specific measurement devices 
designed to evaluate developmental processes is a several step process.  As concepts are 
operationalized through measurement, they take form.  In addition to clarifying what 
exactly comprises epistemology and social influences, the relationships among constructs 
are explored and presented. 
Measurement strategies.  As these constructs emerge, it will become clearer 
how they can be, and need to be measured.  Of particular interest for this study is the 
terminology that will be used to evaluate the constructs.  The literature provides 
theoretical grounding for questions in the survey and the measurement device will in turn 
provide a testing ground for more accurate conversation.  Resulting discussions should 
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propel the discourse about epistemology and social influences closer to application for 
higher educational processes.  Furthermore, future studies can avoid the pitfalls 
encountered by a study that attempts to move from theoretical to operational grounds. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
The goal of this study is to explore the constructs of social influences and 
epistemic beliefs.  The hope is that the factors that emerge and the way they relate will 
eventually provide insight into how both impact educational processes.  Despite recent 
gains in understanding about epistemological development, consistent gaps in 
conceptualization and measurement still exist. More clarity about the nature of social 
influences as they relate to epistemic beliefs can reveal new understandings about the 
developmental process of those beliefs.  Situating these potential constructs and 
conceptualizations of epistemology within a theoretical framework is the task of this 
section of the dissertation.  Though other potential perspectives can be argued, for the 
purpose of this discussion, cognitive development is being framed as a broader 
developmental outlook, and epistemology as a narrower avenue for discussing change.  
The Bioecological Model (Bronfenbrenner, 1994) will also be presented because it more 
directly outlines the effects of context on developmental change.  In response to the goals 
of this project, both cognitive and epistemological development will be examined with an 
emphasis on ways they address change and their histories of measurement.  The refining 
process of measuring epistemic beliefs has clarified troublesome elements of its 
construction, and these results have begun to capture the emergence of social factors.  
Most studies have called for both a valid measure of beliefs and cautioned that any new 
tool must be theoretically grounded.  This section presents some theoretical approaches to 
cognitive and epistemological change and the evolution of their measurement. 
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Robert Kegan’s Cognitive Developmental Theory 
Robert Kegan’s theory is particularly relevant to the influence of social forces on 
cognitive change because he investigates the increasingly demanding cognitive 
expectations of society on individuals as they grow.  Kegan’s book, In Over Our Heads, 
(1994) was written in response to this increasingly “hidden curriculum.”  Kegan 
recognized the growing expectations on the cognitive abilities of people in Western 
societies and offered suggestions for environmental and therapeutic approaches in 
response.  At their roots, his understandings rely heavily on the work of Jean Piaget 
(1932), the founder of modern cognitive development theory.  However, particular 
elements of Kegan’s theory are borrowed from Freudian theory and its subsequent 
offshoots, particularly Object Relations Theory and Neo-Freudian concepts.  
Consideration of these influences begins the conversation about how change is conceived 
in the present study.  That discussion uncovers the nuances of the construct of cognitive 
development and shapes a background for the further consideration of how epistemic 
beliefs are influenced by social factors.   
Freudian influence.  The essential differences between what Kegan (1982) calls 
constructive-developmental processes and Freudian concepts of development emanate 
from the causes of growth.  From a Freudian perspective, it occurs from the inside – out.   
Kegan emphasizes the priority of the self to develop from exterior stimuli.  This influence 
is important to the conversation about change because Kegan’s emphasizes that advanced 
cognitive processes lead to particular considerations of the self’s relationship to context.  
At the core of how cognitive change is shaped by social influences lies the notion of how 
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the self clings to old cognitive schemata versus how it assimilates new stimulus.  Kegan 
focuses on this conflict and uses it to shape his theory. 
Piagetian influence.  Central to Piaget’s framing of development is the idea that 
the mind organizes experience into schemata.  These schemes are results of the child’s 
interaction with direct environmental encounters.  This process is termed “adaptation;” 
the mind forms experiences into organized frames.  Piaget (1932) also uses the two terms, 
assimilation and accommodation when discussing particular moments of growth.  
Through this continual process of adaptation, the child evolves by interpreting her 
environment and building new organizational structures internally (Berk, 2004).  Kegan 
communicates these reorganizations through the metaphor of subject/object relations.  
Foundationally, this language is born out of Object Relations Theory as established by 
Margaret Mahler (1983).  Specifically, she regarded “objects” as mental images of key 
individuals from a person’s life formed in the mind.  As an infant grows, it processes 
through levels of attachment based on these objects.  It is significant that she 
communicates this concept through the use of attachment in terms of relationship.  
Objects, in this sense, are formed by images and behaviors of key individuals in the 
child’s life.  Similarly, we hear overtones of Kegan’s model as Laura Berk describes a 
transition between two stages in Piaget’s model, “Whereas concrete operational children 
can “operate on reality,” formal operational adolescents can “operate on operations”” 
(Berk, 2004, p. 363).  This phraseology is repeated when Kegan describes the transitions 
between “orders of consciousness,” his terminology for developmental levels.  He talks 
about moving from subject to object, wherein the subject is able to differentiate, or move 
from embeddedness as a subject – “this is me” – to a new subject that is larger than the 
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self but encompasses it.  In a similar way that Piaget (1932) describes “operating on 
operations,” the new subject is able to objectify the previous subject – the self “owns” its 
former self.  Development happens as individuals reform their relationships with the 
“objects” in their lives and become able to detach from them as they advance.  
Significantly though, there is a degree of “stuckness” as Kegan’s use of the term, 
“embeddedness” suggests.  Attachments to objects may hinder the developmental 
process. 
Kegan reports that Piaget’s theory describes cognitive development as an act of 
continual interaction between the self and the environment: 
“In fact, Piaget’s vision derives from a model of open-systems evolutionary 
biology.  Rather than locating the life force in the closed individual or the 
environmental press, it locates a prior context which continually elaborates the 
distinction between the individual and the environment in the first place.  …Its 
primary attention…is not to shifts and changes in an internal equilibrium, but to 
equilibrium in the world, between the progressively individuated self and the 
bigger life field...” (Kegan, 1982, p. 43)   
This description captures a significant interpretation by Kegan, a nuance in Piagetian 
development theory.  The subject, as a continually evolving entity, is influenced both by 
its internal and external context, which advances his application of the theory.  This 
framing initiates conversation about the complicated relationship between the self and 
contextual factors.  Developmental theorists rise and fall based on their conceptualization 
of this relationship, and the same is true for this study.  Through emphasizing Piaget’s 
(1932) grasp of the continual evolving of self and environment, Kegan walks the fence 
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between the two, giving some flexibility to his construct, but also opening the door for 
discussion about how development operates between conceptions of the self and its larger 
surroundings. 
The predecessors of Kegan’s constructive-developmental approach provide an 
outline of his general philosophy.  Cognition and the establishment of “the self” are not 
formed through an internal mechanism or hidden id/ego with an agenda, but subjectivity 
is gained contextually and is in constant motion.  Differentiation happens, but it happens 
within a contextual framework.  In other words, development is a continual process of 
construction in motion, of borrowing from the external and adding it to an internal 
context which becomes a new context for the next process. 
Change in cognitive developmental theory.  While the process is not directly 
linear, scholars tend to agree that there is gradual cognitive advancement, or 
development, over time.  Using Kegan’s language, the “subjects” that are created become 
increasingly complex and relativistic.  While there is not a clear delineation of what 
exactly happens, the mechanism of change in cognitive development centers on 
dissonance, assimilation, and accommodation.  As a student interacts with specific 
environmental dissonance, the mind creates a more complex network to deal with this 
stimulus.  Theoretically, multiple reorganizations lead to advanced cognition. However, 
there is also clear evidence of developmental setbacks or lack of change.  When the mind 
reacts to incongruent information toward a more simplistic organization, it reverses 
developmental trends.   
The term egocentrism has been used to describe cognitive inflexibility.  When 
defined as a “failure to distinguish the symbolic viewpoints of others from one’s own” 
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(Berk, 2004, p. 217), it can be said that egocentrism is akin to failing to recognize 
differentiation.  In this sense, despite a confrontation with new environmental stimuli, the 
subject continues to retain previous organizational schemata.  Fred Danner (1981) 
describes egocentrism as a state in which a person acquires a new mental skill or reaches 
a new understanding of their own development and feels empowered to apply that skill or 
sense of growth to multiple new situations.  As that process matures, people become 
“embedded in their own point of view.”  The new skill, way of thinking, or point of view 
eventually becomes obsolete and egocentric application lessens.  Egocentrism has both 
positive and negative effects; we are both excited by new ways of thinking and eventually 
become embedded in them.  This perspective centering can also be equated with 
subjectivity.  The self becomes the center of perspective, the primary subject inside a 
worldview.  As intellectual skill loses novelty, perspective becomes less significant and 
more scrutinized, thus more objective.  Acting with more objectivity opens a person up to 
the possibility of acquiring a new intellectual skill as the mind searches for a novel 
approach, thus repeating the process.   
Most students enter college at a developmental stage close to Kegan’s Second 
Order Consciousness, which is characterized by the mind’s creation of “durable 
categories” – lasting classifications of physical objects, people, and desires which come 
to have properties of their own that characterize them as distinct from “me.” (Love & 
Guthrie, 1999).  The nature of the second order to formulate differentiation makes the 
categories separable and distinct.  The mind creates clear boundaries between categories.  
The durable nature of the categories, in effect, makes them incomparable.  Shifting into 
the third order of consciousness, that of multiplicity, in which one begins to grasp the 
17 
relationships between categories, is counter-intuitive to the second order’s separateness.  
Assimilating and then accommodating this difference generally takes multiple 
reorganizations. 
The language of change in cognitive development study focuses on the mind’s 
incorporation of environmental dissonance.  Change between the Second and Third Order 
of Consciousness (as defined by Kegan, 1982) happens slowly as resistance caused by 
egocentrism and the strong nature of the mind’s organization is overcome and new 
schemata are formed. 
Epistemological Developmental Theory 
William Perry (1970) was the pioneer of epistemological development theory as 
applied to college students.  His findings and analytical method presented a coherent 
model of beliefs formation.  This study examined the nature of students’ thoughts about 
knowledge, their conceptions of truth, and the way they felt those beliefs compared to 
others in college at Harvard.  Berk describes how he characterized the way  
“Younger students regarded knowledge as made up of separate units whose truth 
could be determined by comparing them to abstract standards – standards that 
exist apart from the thinking person and his or her situation.  As a result, they 
engaged in dualistic thinking, dividing information, values and authority into right 
and wrong, good and bad, we and they.” She goes on to explain Perry’s findings 
that “older students …moved toward relativistic thinking… [and] consequently, 
they gave up the possibility of absolute truth in favor of multiple truths, each 
relative to its context” (2004, p. 432).   
18 
This basic premise has been the center of evaluating the epistemological beliefs of 
college students.  While Perry had the intention of understanding the way students at 
Harvard were facing a changing culture, his primary contribution was a stage-like model 
of development and a scheme that outlines the tendencies of growth.  Of most 
significance, perhaps, is his finding that most college students struggle with moving from 
dualistic to multiple perspectives and this conflict forms the background for change.  This 
is consistent with Kegan’s constructive-developmental model.  Perry’s work does fit into 
cognitive development frameworks, but is more specifically directed at perspectives 
about knowledge.  His research represents a seminal work in the field of epistemology. 
In 1990, Marlene Schommer presented a theory of epistemological beliefs with 
five constructs, three that described the nature of knowledge and two that dealt with 
knowledge acquisition.   Her Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) hypothesized a five 
epistemic beliefs construct: (a) Simple Knowledge (b) Omniscient Authority (c) Certain 
Knowledge (d) Innate Ability (e) Quick Learning.  This designation “represented a 
significant shift in epistemological research” (Wheeler, 2007, p. 20) because her 
dimensions were more independent than the broad structures of previous conceptions of 
epistemology.   
The Simple Knowledge construct described the way in which understandings 
moved from seeing knowledge as small, separate particles to concepts that meshed 
together (Schommer, 1990).  Certainty of Knowledge expressed a similar developmental 
pattern of movement – from absolute to tentative – as Perry’s scheme.  Omniscient 
Authority refers to the continuum starting with the less-developed conception that 
knowledge can only be acquired from an authority to the more-developed notion that 
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learning is interactive and to be self-discovered.  Significant to this study, “this is the 
only hypothesized dimension that has failed to emerge in factor analytic studies of 
Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire” (Schommer, 1990; Schraw et al., 2002; 
Wood & Kardash, 2002) (Wheeler 2007, p. 21).  These findings refuted Schommer’s 
original hypothesis that Omniscient Authority is a valid construct of epistemological 
beliefs.  As a result, this study hypothesizes authority as a factor of social influences 
rather than a source of knowledge as it was originally conceived. 
Schommer named the fourth construct Innate Ability.  Similarly to the other 
constructs, a more naïve point of view saw intelligence as an inherited ability and less 
like a skill that could be developed.  The second knowledge acquisition attribute, and the 
fifth epistemological belief construct was Quick Learning.  In the more advanced view, 
knowledge could be attained with continued effort and persistence and conversely, the 
underdeveloped view saw learning as happening rapidly or not at all. 
Following in Schommer’s footsteps, Barbara Hofer (2000) proposed a similar 
theory of epistemological beliefs and created a survey to verify her hypotheses.  After 
factor analyzing her results, Hofer claimed that two categories formed personal 
epistemology: the nature of knowledge – what one believes knowledge is; and the nature 
or process of knowing – how one comes to know.  These two continua validated 
Schommer’s conception of epistemology and simultaneously streamlined it by 
eliminating the impact of conceptions of authority, truth, and other socially driven 
concepts. 
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Hofer also attempted to differentiate developmental models from independent 
beliefs about knowledge.  Essentially, she viewed development as an interconnected 
system of webs made up of points of beliefs.  This added the personal dimension of 
epistemological development to the construct.  As people identify and justify their 
conceptions of knowledge, developmental growth occurs.  However, these conceptions 
also seem to cluster around particular commonalities about sophisticated understandings 
of knowledge.  As noted in other developmental schemes, beliefs about the structure of 
knowledge still move from simple to complex and justification for knowing moves from 
subjective to objective.  This corresponds to Perry’s analysis and Kegan’s orders. 
Epistemological change theory.  While some solid contributions to the field 
have been made, scholars have yet to unilaterally confirm exactly what is happening as 
students change epistemic beliefs.  Despite the progression of analysis since Perry’s 1970 
study, the majority of researchers still call for a more finite synopsis of change.  Hofer 
claims, “Fewer suggestions about instructional implications come from those studying 
beliefs, perhaps because we know less about belief acquisition and belief change, an area 
that needs more attention in the epistemological realm” (2001, p. 375).  As a result, the 
impact of epistemological analysis has been limited because of its failure to directly 
address how specific development occurs.  Marcia Baxter Magolda (2004), who has 
contributed multiple studies to the field, suggested that more research “focused on the 
interplay between internal and external factors in developmental change” is needed 
because of the role authority and expertise play in shared knowledge (p. 41, 42).  Insight 
into the way in which authority and social context prohibit and encourage growth is 
needed because of the relational aspect of the shift from formulaic responses toward more 
21 
objective ones.  This study is an attempt to provide clarity about how development 
happens by exploring the epistemic beliefs of students and the way their social contexts 
influence change in those beliefs. 
Some researchers, exemplified by David Long (2011) in particular, claim that 
general stage models give little consideration to the effects of context.  As a result, 
leaders in educational settings, have difficulty applying the concepts of general 
epistemology (Hofer 2001).  The detriment of a context-neutral approach is that little can 
be shared about how change happens in specific instances.  As most recent data on 
epistemology is gained from interviews, context has been exposed as highly relevant and 
more consistently taken into consideration (Pizzolato et al., 2012).  Theoretical 
conclusions can be drawn from individual contexts as they are commonly experienced, 
but these must be more clearly delineated and analyzed at the microscopic level.  Loucas 
Louca, Andrew Elby, David Hammer, and Trisha Kagey addressed this conclusion when 
they suggested that “stage-based accounts fail to identify a mechanism for [the] 
occurrence of [within-subject variability]” and that “opening up the “black box” of a 
developmental stage and exploring the finer grained cognitive elements within” reveals 
profound insight (2004, p. 61).  To date, their introduction of this concept has not been 
adequately verified.  When they described beliefs as “the units—the cognitive “atoms”—
of epistemologies,” it resonated with demands in the literature for a more detailed, 
analytical approach to the nature of epistemological change (Louca et al., 2004). 
Bendixen and Rule’s (2004) epistemological change model synthesized several 
theories, but was not based on an actual study.  Despite demand for research focused on 
epistemic change, their ideas were neither borrowed by other scholars, nor consistently 
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used as a framework for proving or disproving the elements involved in change.  Key 
concepts in the “mechanism of change” model are “epistemic doubt, epistemic volition, 
and resolution strategies” (Bendixen & Rule, 2004, p. 69).  The operative phrase for 
discontent in this theoretical framework is epistemic doubt.  As people are confronted 
with discrepancies between their understandings about the source and complexity of 
knowledge, doubt occurs.  “Dissonance is the more general feeling of disequilibrium and 
epistemic doubt is specifically questioning epistemological beliefs or weighing 
epistemological options” (Bendixen & Rule, 2004, p. 74).  Describing dissonance as a 
more general phenomenon highlights subtle, but key differences between epistemological 
development and cognitive development.  Epistemology is framed to more directly 
examine specific beliefs about knowledge – its certainty, significance, origin and 
justification (Pintrich, 2002), while cognitive development theories tend to focus on shifts 
or changes in broader schemata and deal with empirical dissonance.  Using the term 
doubt to sort out how individual beliefs about knowledge have changed or grown in 
complexity may help researchers describe how both epistemological change occurs and 
cognitive advancement begins, but not completes, its schematic organization process.  In 
examining this phenomenon, knowing how and why individual beliefs are doubted lends 
specificity to developmental processes.  In the interest of measuring change, it is 
necessary to formulate a context of epistemological origin.  Knowing how individuals 
prioritize informational authority and which processes of understanding they typically 
practice to formulate beliefs serve as a background for the entrance of doubt. 
Volition is the second aspect of the mechanism of change.  In order for people to 
move through perspective shifting about knowledge, a force of will is typically enacted.  
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Lee Corno (1993) defined volition as a “dynamic system of psychological control 
processes that protect concentration and directed effort in the face of personal and/or 
environmental distraction” (p. 16).  When faced with the distraction of contrasts to belief, 
the mind reacts with processes that move toward resolution.  Control and protection 
systems erupt in a manner that attempt to resolve doubt and discrepancies in experience.  
This is similar to the process of assimilation discussed in cognitive development theory.  
Baxter Magolda (2004) describes the process as individuals taking ‘responsibility’ for 
their epistemological beliefs.  It must be pointed out that volition is not necessarily 
directed toward advancement, complexity or relativity.  Recognizing the imprint of 
volition provides insight into which processes and information are being challenged, 
modified or evaded. 
 Resolution is the third step in Bendixen and Rule’s mechanism of change model.  
The drive of volition moves the mind toward resolution.  Volition is a more reactive 
process and cannot be indefinitely sustained; movement is merely initiated and resolution 
is a healthy outcome.  However, before resolution can be a viable option, the perspective 
that has caused epistemic doubt needs to be tenable.  Bendixen noted the influence of 
Dole and Sinatra (1998) and claimed, “A key element in the possibility for change is that 
new information must be comprehensible, coherent, plausible, and rhetorically 
compelling to a particular individual.  Essentially, if this discernment results in evidence 
that seems credible, then more advanced beliefs can develop” (Bendixen, 2004, p. 72).  
There may be a direct correlation between the convincing nature of new information, 
experience or perspective and personal epistemological development.  Alternatively, 
students sometimes do not progress no matter the profundity of the information.  
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Regression is a potential outcome of resolution.  In these cases, it is quite possible that 
social factors override the plausibility of new ideas. This also validates the role reflection 
plays in the process, which is a process of understanding how an experience challenges 
previously held beliefs and influences the formation of new ones.  Metacognitive ability 
may also help students move through this process more adeptly.  Reflection is a 
predominantly objective process, requiring that the subject distance itself from what is 
being evaluated.  While students within most stages of development could perform such a 
task, the quality of their analysis would increase at advanced levels.  This again suggests 
that epistemological processes are situated within broader cognitive orders.   
Jane Pizzolato has most recently added to the work of Baxter Magolda in further 
examining self-authorship, absolute knowing, transitional knowing, and the relationship 
of context to change.  She separated internally and externally motivated decision-making 
catalysts and outlined different decision making purposes.  She used all of these concepts 
to focus on change and in particular, the concept of the “provocative moment.”  Pizzolato 
describes this as “an experience that resulted from jarring disequilibrium” and “led to 
commitment to, rather than only recognition of the need to turn inward in a search for 
self-definition” (2005, p. 625).  In a classical sense, she connects experiences of 
disequilibrium to moments of change.  Furthermore, harkening to one of Perry’s scheme 
stations, “commitment in relativism,” she implies change has to do with commitments 
toward new behaviors.  Pizzolato’s work is significant because it begins the process of 
examining the change process by qualifying some moments over others as provocative.  
There is also evidence that these moments are individually differentiated over criteria like 
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volitional efficacy and behavior regulation.  These characteristics are a beginning point 
for discussing the nature of change, particularly as it is immersed within student contexts. 
Introduction to Social Influences 
In this study, particular social influences have been identified to connect 
appropriate concepts of contextual change with the construct of personal epistemology.  
They are introduced here as elements in the change process and fit within Bendixen and 
Rule’s (2004) model as a result of doubt and as an influencing factor shaping volition.  
Starting from the concept that context impacts change, generally, they are ontological, 
social forces that deter or promote growth.   Students can become “stuck” in 
developmental processes, as noted by Kegan (1982) and clarified by the concept of 
egocentrism.  However, the concept of social influences suggests that students are mired 
in a social milieu made up of authority, attachment, and affect rather than in a particular 
developmental stage or fixation of ego.  These concepts do not refer to an ideological 
embeddedness, or a particular embedded concept.  Rather, this study explores a 
configuration of social and contextual factors resulting in “clinginess” to epistemic 
beliefs.  Insights from a theoretical framework emerging from how cognitive 
development and epistemological development address change deepen the analysis into 
the nature of relationships between context, beliefs about knowledge, and development.  
The process of measurement in both cognitive and epistemological studies has 
also contributed to understandings of these social influence factors.  Qualitative measures 
of cognitive development have informed the construct by evaluating and emphasizing 
particular social and affective elements.  Quantitative measures, mostly through factor 
analysis, have revealed particular hypothesized dimensions which appear to “fall out,” or 
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be determined as non-significant.  These measures have clarified which aspects of 
elements should remain as part of the construct and which ones should be eliminated.  
The Social Influences Survey (SIS) has been created in response to these potential 
factors.   The survey will be used alongside the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory (EBI, 
discussed below) to explore this relationship. 
Quantitative Measures of Epistemology 
Tracing the way in which devices that measure epistemic beliefs have evolved 
brings clarity to both the nature of the construct and the effectiveness of those tools.  
Omniscient Authority, in particular, has proven troublesome to measure and has been 
often been removed from research projects.  The evolution of these quantitative measures 
has been recounted here both to present a clearer picture of the construct of epistemic 
beliefs and to establish that authority is more accurately theorized as an element of social 
context. 
Marlene Schommer (1990) used the term epistemology to describe the 
developmental process Perry (1970) investigated.  However, her research worked to 
examine the connection between epistemological beliefs and comprehension, which 
linked it to cognitive development.  Her “conceptualization of personal epistemology as a 
multi-dimensional set of beliefs…initiated a methodological shift toward quantitative 
measurement of the construct.” (Wheeler, 2007, p. 29).  This conceptualization matches 
the later findings of researchers like Hammer and Elby and Hofer who suggested changes 
in beliefs could be measured more directly than general cognitive shifts.  As a result, 
unlike other researchers in the field, Schommer wasn’t convinced that interviews were 
the best way to measure epistemological level, so she developed and continually 
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operationalized a questionnaire.  Her use of a combination survey and a comprehension 
test fit her specific research questions, but they also provided a model other researchers 
could use to apply to educational settings. 
Schommer borrowed heavily from the measurement device created by Rand Spiro 
(Feltovich, Spiro, & Coulson, 1989) in forming her own questionnaire to examine the 
connection between comprehension and personal epistemology.  Feltovich, Spiro, and 
Coulson’s research established that medical students tend to apply simple learning 
processes to more complex problems when they receive simplistic and regimented 
instruction.  Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson (1993) used Schommer’s questionnaire and 
similarly discovered that students expressed different levels of complex or simplistic 
thinking across a variety of fields.  This school of researchers investigated why some 
students showed growth in one area of study and not another.  They began asking how 
complex relative thinking in one field could be applied to other disciplines.  Their results 
also suggested that developmental studies could be compartmentalized to investigate 
cognitive processes in more detail.  This area of research and its concepts has been 
termed domain specific epistemology. 
Schommer‘s  efforts to quantify beliefs serve as a foundation for resulting 
methodologies and are thus the starting point for modifying quantitative tools.  Her 
Epistemology Questionnaire (EQ) was administered to 263 students, primarily freshmen 
and sophomores.  The factor Omniscient Authority produced low loadings during factor 
analysis, but the other four constructs were confirmed.  Schommer conducted a second 
study and used factor analysis to further attempt to validate her construct (Schommer, 
Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992).  The results caused her to merge Innate Ability and Quick 
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Learning into one factor.  A third analysis was conducted, this time with a sample of 
1182 high school students (Schommer, 1993).  This study essentially confirmed the four 
dimensions of the construct.  A fourth survey was given to 418 working adults 
(Schommer 1998) that gave similar results.  While Schommer’s construct did not produce 
overwhelmingly significant results (the four factors accounted for 46% - 53% of the total 
variance in the four studies), it continued to be studied and built upon by other 
researchers. 
Seeking to create a survey that examined domain specific epistemological beliefs 
in mathematics, which resulted in The Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics 
(EBSM), Wheeler (2007) presented a thorough analysis of measures that had been used 
to that date.  Among others, these included the Revised Epistemological Belief 
Questionnaire (Qian & Alvermann, 1995), the Beliefs About Learning Questionnaire 
(Jehng et al., 1993) and two significant foreign language translations of the construct 
(Chan & Elliott, 2000; Clarebout, Elen, Luyten, & Bamps, 2001).  Overall, her analysis 
suggests that continued refining of the process of measuring beliefs has proven difficult.  
Predominantly, there was some consistency, but most measures fell short of statistically 
acceptable levels.  In the end, Wheeler used the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory (EBI) 
(Schraw et al., 2002) to validate the EBSM because it was the most often tested, and 
therefore most reliable starting point for investigating her construct. 
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory.  The Epistemic Beliefs Inventory was created to 
improve the reliability of the EQ and further analyze epistemological beliefs constructs.  
The researchers hypothesized that a shorter instrument might improve psychometric 
consistency.  Both the EQ and EBI were administered to 161 students.  “The EBI 
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generated five factors with eigenvalues greater than one, representing 60% of the total 
variance” (Wheeler, 2007, p. 50).  This seemed to suggest that the EBI was a more 
reliable measure, but when the surveys were re-administered, the two results were 
compared and statistical analysis revealed, “it is unclear what these two instruments 
measure and the extent to which they measure the same or unrelated constructs” (Schraw 
et al., 2002, p. 273).  Such results are discouraging, but continued testing implies that the 
construct is somewhat valid but needs fine-tuning.  Welch and Ray (2013) analyzed 
further reproductions of the EBI and report that some factors consistently account for 
acceptable levels of variance.  These revolve around four of Schommer’s original 
constructs: Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge, Speed of Knowledge and Innate 
Ability, with some variations in terminology.  However, “The factor identified by Schraw 
(1995) as Omniscient Authority (Q4, Q7, Q20, Q27, Q28) did not emerge from our 
analysis.  Kardash and Wood (2000) were also unable to isolate Omniscient 
Authority…as a unique factor.” (Welch and Ray, 2013, p. 295).  Wheeler (2007) found 
the same to be true in her comparison of the EBSM to the EBI.  The nature of the effect 
of authority on development remains ambiguous despite multiple attempts to include it as 
a dimension of epistemic beliefs. 
Measuring epistemic beliefs to statistically valid levels has continued to evade 
researchers.  The desire to understand the relationship between epistemic beliefs, 
classroom environments, developmental considerations, and the influence of teachers, 
parents and peers remains (Muis, 2004).  In order to examine the confluence of these 
interconnected systems, an accurate measure of epistemic beliefs is needed (Wheeler, 
2007).  Despite the way in which a concrete consensus has eluded researchers, key advice 
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has emerged for future research.  In particular, due diligence must be paid to generate a 
construct grounded in accurate theory.  When this is present, the inadequacies of 
measures still allow for insight into the nature of the constructs in play.  Furthermore, 
dimensions must be carefully chosen and firmly theoretically grounded to be reliable 
among multiple samples.  This will also allow for explanatory rather than just descriptive 
results, which may produce a more accurate construct (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, 
Thoma, & Hestevold, 2008).  The history of measurement has refined what epistemic 
belief elements should be included.  While not with ideal results, measurements have 
concluded that Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge, and Innate Ability/Quick 
Learning have proven more to be stable indicators of epistemic beliefs.  As such, a 
conclusion that Omniscient Authority may relate to epistemological beliefs in a different 
way is reasonable.  
Ecological Developmental Theory 
In seeking to earnestly provide theoretical clarity and debate, the Bioecological 
Model (Bronfenbrenner, 1994) is presented here as an alternative developmental theory.  
It exists as a broader developmental model that can be applied to a variety of processes of 
which cognition and epistemology are only two.  The model helps establish social 
influences as a factor in development because it closely examines both the change 
process and the shaping nature of context in terms of development. 
In a landmark study, Urie Bronfenbrenner conceptualized development (1979) 
and later considered it from a biological point of view.  His model presented development 
as a result of multiple levels of systems operating interactively with an individual.  This 
organic, dynamic systems structure suggested that different groupings of environments 
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had different effects during the developmental process at any given time (1999).  His 
conception of context involved four interrelated systems – microsystem, mesosystem, 
exosystem, and macrosystem (listed from the inside out).  He later identified the 
chronosystem, which added the dimension of time to the model.  The microsystem and 
mesosystem and their processes most closely inform development as it relates to 
individual change and therefore will be more closely presented.  The microsystem 
includes the person and all immediate environmental forces such as neighborhood, 
school, home, and workplace.  Study and discussion around the microsystem involved 
patterns of activity, roles, and interpersonal experiences.  These encapsulated places of 
immediate contact between the child and the environment.  The mesosystem focused on 
the interconnected relationships between microsystems, “in short, it is a system of two or 
more microsystems” (Bronfenbrenner, 1999, p. 17).  Most developmental models do 
mention that context impacts change, but the Bioecological Model more clearly 
establishes the way these environments interact.  Both the makeup of mesosystems, the 
way in which individuals mesh their contexts interactively, as well as the influences of 
agents in the microsystem directly informs the construct of social influences used in this 
study. 
Change in Ecological Development.  Bronfenbrenner’s later writings 
emphasized the significance of processes on human development.  He described the 
Process-Person-Context-Time model (PPCT), which has become the essence of his 
theory.  Proximal processes, those involving more immediacy between the individual and 
her environment, were the most influential in development. (Tudge, Mokrova, Hatfield, 
& Karnik, 2009).  Bronfenbrenner noted that these interactions were more effective when 
32 
they “occur on a fairly regular basis over extended periods of time” (Bronfenbrenner & 
Morris, 1998, p. 996).  The impact of proximal processes is shaped by “form, power, 
content, and direction” as well as the characteristics of the developing person.  Based on 
the evidence of a study on parenting, he noted that higher levels of interaction tended to 
trump environmental effects.  In other words, the more consistent the process and the 
more intimate the relationship, the greater its impact on development. 
“Person” in the model refers to characteristics of the developing person.  He 
further compartmentalized these into demand, resource, and force characteristics to 
clarify their operation in the process.  These include but are not limited to age, gender, 
housing, parents, temperament, and motivation. 
“Context” refers to any of the systems – micro, meso, exo, macro – previously 
described. 
Bronfenbrenner broke down the influence of “Time” (the chronosystem) into 
similar micro, meso, and macro forms.  Of importance is the duration, consistency and 
timing of proximal processes. 
In the Bioecological Model, developmental change happens through proximal 
processes that are “progressively more complex reciprocal interactions.”  These vary 
systematically as a joint function of the characteristics of the developing person, of the 
environment – both immediate and remote – in which the processes are taking place, and 
the nature of the developmental outcomes under consideration (Bronfenbrenner, 1994). 
Operationalizing Social Influences 
The literature shows that there are contextual forces at play in the shaping of 
cognitive and epistemological development.  The change process is intricately affected by 
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social and environmental factors.  Breaking down the nature of change into smaller 
processes and in particular moments reveals that dispositions toward knowledge hold 
students in naïve stages or promotes them toward more advanced stages.  “Rozendaal, de 
Brabander, & Minnaert (2001) emphasize that knowledge construction does not take 
place in a vacuum, but in a social process of discussion” (Bromme, Kienhues, & Stahl, 
2008, p. 437).  As a result, unpacking the way social influences shape the formation of 
epistemic beliefs is core to the study.  Bronfenbrenner brings clarity to the nature of these 
influences by suggesting they are socially constructed through continual interactive 
processes.  These most often occur in the microsystem and through the mesosystem.  
Pizzolato, Nguyen, Johnston, and Wang (2012) confirmed this by claiming development 
“may be more interpersonal than autonomous, as it has been previously documented” (p. 
673). Understanding the way the psychological contexts of family and peers impact 
moments of doubt is central to evaluating epistemological change.  The nature of social 
influences will be clarified in this study to give more meaningful significance to the 
results of the research. 
Heidegger describes how the developing person is “born into a world with 
cultural equipment – a heritage of traditions embodied in situated understandings” 
(Heidegger 1962 [1927]) (Long 2011, p. 90).  Development is shaped, therefore, by the 
traditions of family, the processes of interaction, and the psychological pull of 
microsystem level forces.  Exposing the nature of these relationships and grasping the 
way they affect epistemic belief change leads to a greater understanding of how social 
influences are being framed for the present exploratory study.  While there may be future 
efforts that examine multiple other factors, those presented here are supported by the 
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literature and previous studies.  The resulting relevant social influence constructs to be 
explored include epistemological authority, awareness of interpersonal attachment, and 
pressure imposed by a fear of loss. 
Authority.  Omniscient Authority was one of the original constructs hypothesized 
by Schommer.  In its conception, it was defined as an aspect of the Source of Knowledge.  
It was also emphasized by Perry.  These perspectives suggested authority permitted the 
knower to avoid responsibility for making judgments about particular knowledge claims 
(Braten, Britt, Stromso, & Rouet, 2011). Theoretically, a point of view would be 
considered more valid if it came from a person or other representation of authority.  
Students would not have to think responsibly, engage with the idea, or make a judgment 
about it if they held a naïve perspective, essentially trusting that the authority was “right.”  
More advanced students may engage multiple perspectives from different sources of 
authority and make more complex judgments.  As an epistemological construct, authority 
was examined as a source of knowledge rather than one with relational implications.  
Authority was measured in terms of “correctness” regardless of the relationship to the 
knower.  It was continually found as unreliable in factor studies, but it has been included 
in this study with the original EBI survey for the sake of historical consistency.  
However, additional questions about authority in the SIS have been crafted in response to 
the hypothesis that authority may carry a relational factor in addition to a developmental 
one.  Determining the ways in which these two concepts of authority intermingle and 
separate may provide significant contributions to the study of epistemic beliefs. 
For this study, authority has been reconceived as a factor of social influence.  This 
may not only help clarify the nature of the force of authority on development, but add to 
35 
the clarity of the Omniscient Authority construct of epistemic beliefs.  As an embodied 
person, authority establishes preconceived notions about knowledge through social 
influence.  Authority may also be a manifestation of “historical contingency and social 
power.”  In these cases, “Truth is, for such people, timeless and immutable.  To question 
this type of Truth meaningfully is to shake off the spell that such Truth holds over its 
believers” (Long, 2011, p. 58).  Conceptually, the developing person reacts to doubt by 
relying on an authority, be it a person or social norm, and therefore fails, in that instance, 
to develop.  To be clear, this would be established according to the person’s dependence 
on the source rather than the plausibility of the concept at hand.  Previous conceptions of 
epistemology saw this factor as a dimension on the developmental pathway – as a naïve 
or complex evaluation of the source of knowledge.  Reconstructed here, authority is a 
contextual influence that prohibits or promotes change.  The strongest authorities are the 
ones most closely aligned with the learner and are often engaged with them in proximal 
processes.  Long (2011) also describes how exclusivist thinking from a person’s past or 
upbringing can mute inquiry, which inhibits epistemological reflexivity.  Pizzolato and 
her co-authors note that these kinds of authorities are often familial or cultural (Pizzolato 
et al., 2012).  As a construct of social influence, the power of epistemological authority 
permits the student to disengage from doubt, relying on authoritative others with whom 
they consistently interact.   
Naïveté of attachment.  The second social influences factor to be explored 
regards the level of understanding a student has of the nature of their personal 
attachments.  Described in terms of the Bioecological Model, a developing person could 
operate with a generally closed, but active microsystem.  A student in this situation may 
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have more simplistic proximal processes interacting with dissonance or doubt.  When 
doubt does surface, the student has influential relationships to consider and may evaluate 
how changing her perspective may impact those relationships.  However, it is not the 
significance of these relationships and how habitually they inform epistemic decision-
making that deters or promotes developmental growth, but rather the student’s awareness 
of them.  This research attempts to measure the student’s naïveté regarding the strength 
of their social attachments as they apply to epistemic beliefs.  Pizzolato and her 
colleagues present an alternative self-authorship model, the Interactional Model of Self-
Authorship, which considers the interplay of these psychological contextual factors.  
They claim that, “what seems to develop is not a system of self-authorship, but an ability 
to manage an existing system” (Pizzolato et al., 2012, p. 674).  They also suggest that 
different psychological fields exert different levels of pressure on the cognitive system.  
This model would assess cognitive developmental level according to how aware a student 
is of the competing factors within the system they are managing.  Bronfenbrenner notes 
that proximal processes have varying effects based on multiple factors, one of which is 
the constitution of the family, particularly parental contributions.  A student with a more 
closely-knit social circle will experience a different developmental pattern.  This is not to 
suggest that a student who emphasizes these relationships is “overdependent (and 
therefore less developed), but… [expresses] a way in which the student fuses multiple 
contexts of his or her life” (Pizzolato et al., 2012, p. 676).  Posited differently, a student 
who knows and acknowledges the ways in which her relationships influence her 
decisions about beliefs and information and how she manages these inputs is more 
significant to change than the nature of the relationships themselves.   Merging the 
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theories presented by the Bioecological Model and the Interactional Model of Self-
Authorship leads to the understanding that intimate relationships are likely the highest 
influencer of development, “but self-authorship occurs when there is a higher level of 
awareness of these systems and a person is able to manage the already existing systems” 
(Pizzolato et al., 2012, p. 675).  Those who more accurately understand how their closely 
tied relationships are involved in establishing epistemological beliefs develop more 
readily.  Naïveté of attachment is therefore concerned with how cognizant students are of 
their contexts rather than whether or not those contexts are more or less developed.  As a 
result, the goal is to measure how much a student grasps the influence of those ties.  Long 
describes that students who attempted to grow beyond the constraints of these 
relationships “risked disenfranchisement” from their family and social groups.  The 
intimacy of those relationships from an epistemological standpoint does impact their 
belief systems; however, the risk they may feel is more related to a third aspect of social 
influences. 
Fear of potential loss.  Implicitly, David Long (2011) identified a key aspect for 
this study while he explored student dispositions concerning epistemic beliefs about 
science.  As students emerge from First Order Consciousness, they inherit much of their 
understanding about knowledge from their environment, and as Bronfenbrenner points 
out, these are mainly composed by those within the microsystem (1994).  The kinds of 
environmental doubt children are likely to face are limited.  As a result, students enter 
“provocative moments” with limited understandings about knowledge.  Long describes 
these as ontologies, or worldviews.  His discussions with some students revealed strong 
emotional attachment to their worldview, regardless of the composition of their beliefs.  
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As he further examined the way they wrestled with doubt, he expressed that they fear 
losing cultural meaning and social connectedness.  For many of these students, epistemic 
change was equated with serious emotional loss.  Grasping the nature of this kind of loss 
reveals some reasons why students progress or regress when they are faced with doubt.  
Long compared the way in which some students emerged to new understandings to 
jumping off an existential cliff: 
“Reframing one’s ontological stance, or having it reframed for you, has definite 
social costs.  Now, as we will explore later, it may also have benefits, but when 
standing at this brink, one only sees the possibility of destruction from a fall or the 
possibility of self-annihilation by throwing one’s self off into the abyss” (Long 
2011, p. 42). 
Not only is shifting ones epistemology a matter of wrestling with doubt, it also is 
significantly impacted by emotion.  
Contrastingly, as noted above, Bendixen (2002) argues (via Dole and Sinatra, 
1998) that plausibility is an element of doubt and that clear coherent evidence may be a 
force in epistemological development, claiming that it cements doubt in the student’s 
mind.  She also suggests that doubt involves weighing evidence and discerning 
truthfulness.  While this in part may be a developmental concern, the emotional factors 
involved, particularly for students who are deeply entrenched in absolutist cultures and 
ways of life has been less explored.  Haviland and Kramer (1991) confirm that emotional 
spikes usually accompany growth (Bendixen & Rule, 2004).   These can also lead to 
regression.  While the outcomes are unpredictable, epistemological changes are typically 
preceded by emotional experiences.  While results vary individually, students with 
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absolutist ontologies exhibited in microsystem level relationships could be predicted to 
have more difficulty advancing epistemic beliefs. 
  Querying students about the repercussions of changing beliefs could lead to a 
clearer understanding of a potential obstacle to epistemological development.   Jennifer 
Berger (2010) echoes Kegan in describing the costs involved in moving into new 
cognitive understandings, suggesting that “a new way of seeing the world means first 
giving up your old way of seeing the world, understanding that what used to feel full and 
fulfilling now feels partial and lacking” (p. 17).  Conceptually, students with strong 
feelings toward their beliefs will experience anxiety with the prospect of change.  
Interviews and personal conversations can unveil some of this, however, these findings 
tend to be subjective in nature and reveal less about trends experienced by students who 
are in similar situations. While the nuances of these connections would be difficult at best 
to determine through a survey, general forms of affect can be measured.  Students in their 
first years of college likely experience similar emotional struggles as it pertains to 
epistemology.  This third factor, fear of potential loss, seeks to evaluate the relative 
connectedness a student feels to their social environment as measured by a perceived fear 
of sacrificing it when facing change. 
Summary 
The effect of epistemic beliefs on education continues to be an often studied 
concept, but according to previous studies and analysis, more clarity is needed.  More 
accurately understanding the nature of how epistemic beliefs affect learning can 
contribute to a number of applications that may improve educational practices.  However, 
the construct of epistemic beliefs continues to produce unreliable measurement results.  
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Modifying current conceptions of epistemology led to a refining of the construct.  The 
current study hopes to add to that practice by examining three social influences factors: 
authority, fear of potential loss and naiveté of attachment.  This study employs these 
particular factors to more closely examine contextual influences on epistemological 
change.  The results of a self-report survey of college students will be used to conduct a 
factor analysis to determine the fit of these constructs and instrument questions.  They 
will also be compared to the EBI to determine if stronger or weaker social influences are 
related to mature or naïve epistemic beliefs.  This analysis will produce a clearer 
understanding of how social, contextual factors are associated with epistemic beliefs, 
suggest modifications to measurement devices, and lead to recommend suggestions for 
future study. These can then lead to potential applications for educational practice. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to detail practical aspects of the research methods 
used in the current study.  This includes the nature of the participants, demographic 
considerations, elements of other studies that have been referenced, data collection 
procedures, and statistical analyses performed.  The central piece of the study is a self-
report survey designed to reveal predicted subscales to represent epistemic beliefs and 
social influences.  These subscales were then tested for significant relationships to each 
other.  The survey also allowed for the collection of demographic information to be used 
as control variables, which permitted a more thorough analysis of the constructs involved. 
Procedures 
A pilot test was conducted to check the diction of the questions and to ensure the 
questions yielded appropriate responses.  The sample was tested in September, 2014 with 
23 participants.   The survey was accessed through Qualtrics and made available during 
October of 2014.  The university Internal Research Board application was filed and 
approved during the summer of 2014.  Participants under the age of 18 and over the age 
of 25 were automatically prohibited.  Contact information for students was sought and 
approved through university offices.  Students were emailed a link to the survey.  The 
email and introduction of the survey contained a brief explanation of the purpose of the 
study and instructions for completion and also contained a statement about waiver of 
consent as suggested by the IRB.  All scales, excluding demographic descriptives, were 
measured using a six-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 6 
(very strongly agree).  This scale is consistent with the Epistemological Beliefs Survey 
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for Mathematics (Wheeler, 2007), which was also a project created, in part, to explore 
methods of measuring epistemic beliefs.  Qualtrics automatically compiled responses and 
stored them as well as served as a vehicle to send email introductions.  A final section of 
the measurement device included an opportunity to submit contact information in the 
event that the study could be used for both longitudinal and qualitative evaluation in the 
future.  Otherwise, participants were assured their anonymity.  The survey is presented in 
Appendices A-C. 
Participants 
The sample includes students at a mid-sized Southeastern university.   Ages were 
limited to range from 18 to 25 with the goal of reaching primarily freshmen and 
sophomores.  Attempts were made to include students who are representative of the 
university population.  If initial broad-based email results failed to reach this goal, 
additional students would have been accessed through the Office of Institutional 
Diversity, but this proved unnecessary. 
The total university population of freshmen and sophomores, based on 2012-2013 
data, is 10,050 (http://www.uky.edu/IRPE/students/enrollment/all-by-class.html).  The 
desired minimum sample of 370, based on a confidence level of 95%, was achieved.  
After accommodating for missing data as noted below, an adequate sample size was 
achieved for the factor analyses and regression analyses as well.  Some demographic tests 
had smaller samples because of incomplete data as noted.  Demographic totals for the 
final sample utilized for all subsequent analyses are presented in Table 4.1 – 4.3. This 
sample size compares favorably with other tests in the field. 
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Instruments 
The tool used to measure constructs of epistemological beliefs, the Epistemic 
Beliefs Inventory, was borrowed from the literature.  The Social Influences Survey was 
generated in response to careful analysis of the epistemological change process and ways 
the process is impacted by social context.  The theoretical basis for questions used in the 
survey is presented in the literature review, including reasoning for the hypothesized 
factors. 
Demographic information.  The survey starts with demographic questions that 
include age, college class status, geographic background, parents’ education level, 
gender, racial identification, and field of study (see Appendix B).  The final question in 
the demographic section asked about home environments and friend groups in the hope 
of identifying the homogeneity of social circles, which may be related to social influence 
constructs.  Responses to this question were removed from analysis because the initial 
test sample produced erratic results, most often exemplified by incomplete answers.  
Based on observed responses, this was likely because Qualtrics presented it with a drag-
bar, which secluded much of the question.  The question may be used for future analysis 
if presented in a different manner. 
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory.  The Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) (Schraw et 
al., 2002) was created with the hope of validating the Epistemology Questionnaire 
(Schommer, 1990).  Its original form consists of 28 items measuring five dimensions of 
general epistemic beliefs.  The five hypothesized factors are Omniscient Authority, 
Certain Knowledge, Simple Knowledge, Innate Ability, and Quick Learning (Wheeler, 
2007). As noted in the literature review, several resulting studies attempted to validate the 
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EBI, but because results proved difficult to replicate, modifications have been suggested. 
While creating the Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics, Wheeler reported 
coefficient alpha reliability estimates for a validation sample of 160 undergraduate 
university students ranged from 0.58 to 0.68 and noted that although these reliability 
estimates are less than optimal, they are typical of reliability estimates reported in 
psychometric studies of general epistemological beliefs.  Despite the trouble associated 
with the EBI, it remains the most psychometrically sound measure of general epistemic 
beliefs currently available.  It has also been tested multiple times and is therefore the 
most refined test to date.  The purpose of including it in the current study is to assess the 
relationship between epistemic beliefs and social influences.  Rather than create a new 
measure of epistemic beliefs, the EBI has been included in its original form to maintain 
consistency with previous research (see Appendix C). 
Social Influences Survey.  The social influences questions of the survey (SIS) 
were created specifically for this study.  The goal of these questions is to measure a 
construct of social influences associated with epistemic change.  Theory noted in the 
literature suggests that growth toward complexity in beliefs may be hindered or promoted 
by dispositions toward beliefs shaped within social circles.  It is predicted that the three 
elements of Authority, Naiveté of Attachment, and Fear of Potential Loss will form the 
social influences construct.  The measure includes sixteen items (see Appendix D). 
Analysis 
Data screening.  Data was screened to remove incomplete survey responses.  
These were checked to see if they could be retained if they were missing totally at 
random according to Little’s MCAR test (1988).  To determine outliers and normality, 
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sum totals of all the responses for each item and their means were recorded for each of 
the EBI and SIS sections of the survey.  Histograms for each mean were examined for 
normality and kurtosis.  Outliers were removed using The Outlier Labeling Rule 
(Hoaglin, & Iglewicz, 1987).  Pearson correlations were checked for evidence of 
multicolinearity.  Responses to questions: EBI1, EBI3-EBI5, EBI7-EBI18, EBI20, 
EBI21, EBI23, EBI24, EBI25, EBI26, EBI27, SIS14 were reverse coded.  Demographic 
questions D1, D3 - D9 were dummy coded in order to analyze them statistically. 
Factor analyses.  A Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed on the results 
from the EBI to explore the five latent factors suggested by Schommer.  Values for the 
Tucker Lewis Index, the Comparative Fit Index, and the Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) were used to examine model fit.  Because it is a newly created 
survey, the SIS was analyzed with an Exploratory Factor Analysis.  
Stepwise multiple regression.  Upon reaching plausible factor models for each of 
the EBI and SIS, subscales were introduced to suggest possible elements composing 
epistemic belief development and social influences.  For each new epistemic belief factor, 
a stepwise regression was run to determine significant relationships between each and the 
social influences factors, resulting from the EFA.   
Hierarchical multiple regression.  Finally, a hierarchical regression was 
performed to test the predictive value of SIS subscales on EBI subscales after controlling 
for demographic variables.  Each hierarchical regression, one for each epistemological 
beliefs subscale, was performed to evaluate the following hypothesis:  It is predicted that 
the social influences factor subscale scores will be significantly negatively associated 
with the epistemology subscale scores after controlling for demographic variables.  This 
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is surmised as a result of theories suggested in the literature review which imply that the 
social modifiers of Authority, Naiveté of Attachment, and Fear of Potential Loss can 
hinder epistemological development. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
The results for each test performed as suggested in the project’s Methodology are 
reported here and are organized according to the research question, “To what extent does 
a measure of authority, naïveté of attachment, and fear of loss as a result of change 
amongst college students help predict their level of epistemological development?”  The 
response to the question centers around quantitatively exploring constructs for both social 
influences and epistemic beliefs.  These were identified using factor analyses, thus 
reported first.  Once the factors were determined, relationships between factors were 
examined by creating subscales for each.  This was then followed by comparative 
stepwise multiple regression.  Finally, with all of these results in view, a hierarchical 
multiple regression was performed and reported in an attempt to show the overall 
relationships between social influences and epistemic beliefs while controlling for 
demographic variables. 
Data screening 
There were 440 responses to the survey.  Several responses to the surveys 
contained large amounts of missing items.  These 59 incomplete surveys were removed.  
Also, because the hypothesized constructs are associated with a small number of items, 
responses with more than two answers missing were removed, leaving 333 complete 
responses and 37 with only one answer missing.  Little’s MCAR test (1988) was 
completed to determine if the 37 cases containing 1 missing value each could be retained.  
The results (Chi square=966.069, sig=.991) supported that the data were completely 
missing at random and therefore, the Expectation Maximization Algorithm (Dempster, 
48 
Laird, & Rubin, 1977) could be used to impute values for missing data.  These data were 
imputed to retain the maximum sample size and 370 cases were used for each of the 
project’s tests.  The Outlier Labeling Rule (Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987) was used to 
determine outliers and no cases beyond the calculated upper and lower bounds were 
revealed. The histograms of the EBI and SIS item means showed that they were 
approximately normal distributions.  Using a value calculated with the standard deviation 
of each produced no evidence of significant kurtosis.  The results were checked for 
multicolinearity.  Upon examining the Pearson correlations between these calculated 
means, no values above .521 were reported, so no issues with multicolinearity were 
found.  Exploratory regressions performed to find VIF values also resulted in values 
within the normal range. 
Demographic results of the sample 
Responses to the demographic questions are recorded in Tables 4.1 – 4.3.  Within 
the responses to the question about race, the “American Indian/Native Alaskan” and 
“European” options only received one response each.  The responses for “other” and “I 
prefer not to answer” also contained small sample sizes, so they were removed from 
analysis.  The racial breakdown of respondents resulted in some small group sizes, but 
these compare reasonably to the student population of the university.  Under majors, only 
two students chose the “Technical” option, so those responses were removed from the 
analysis. 
The Gender variable contained four optional responses, but only two students 
chose “Other” and two chose “Transgender”.  Because of these small numbers, the 
Gender variable was reduced to two categories (Male and Female) for the analysis. 
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Table 4.1 
Group Totals by Demographic 
Table 4.2 
Responses by Race 
African American/Black 19 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 1 
Asian 11 
Asian American 5 
European 1 
White/Caucasian 307 
Latino/Hispanic 15 
Other 6 
I prefer not to answer 5 
Table 4.3 
Responses by Major 
Biological Science 35 
Business 36 
Education 29 
Engineering 57 
Physical Science 14 
Professional 70 
Social Science 40 
Technical 2 
Other 86 
College Class  Freshman: 223 Soph: 124 Junior:23 
Urban/Rural/Suburban Urban: 93 Rural: 114 Suburban: 163 
Gender Male: 97 Female: 267 Trans: 2 Other: 2 
International 6 
Multiracial 30 
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EBI Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Because the EBI was used in its historic form and is backed by consistent theory, 
a Confirmatory Factor Analysis was employed to determine model fit for the data.  The 
following figure shows the predicted linking of the items with the theorized constructs.  
The EBI items can be found written out in the survey (Appendix C).  Figure 4.1, on the 
following page, represents the proposed CFA factor structure. 
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Figure 4.1.  Confirmatory Factor Analysis diagram of hypothesized factors and 
corresponding items from the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory 
52 
The CFA for the hypothesized EBI constructs produced a poor fit using the CFI 
(0.66) and TLI (0.62) measures.  Generally speaking, values of the CFI and TLI 
approaching 1.00 indicate better model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  The RMSEA measured 
0.08, which indicates moderate to poor model fit because values below 0.05 generally 
indicate close model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Therefore, four error terms on the same 
factor showing high covariances (suggested by using the potential chi-square reduction 
bound of 10.00) were coupled and the model recalculated.  This produced similar, but 
only slightly improved results:  CFI (0.71), TLI (0.67), RMSEA (0.07). 
The absolute values of standardized regression weights range from 0.16 to 0.85.  
These values indicate the 28 measurement items represent their latent constructs by a 
wide range of strength.  Generally, standardized regression weights approaching 1.00 
suggest a closer tie between construct and item.  These results indicate the model 
captures many weak relationships between items and constructs because most of the 
items had loadings less than 0.50 on their presumed latent factor.  These low loadings and 
the above model fit results indicate a generally poor model fit, suggesting that an 
Exploratory Factor Analysis for the EBI section of the survey was in order. 
Despite poor fit with the CFA, an ensuing EFA could reveal latent constructs for 
epistemic beliefs.  Similar studies of the EBI have also resulted in poor model fit and low 
loadings on factors (Welch & Ray 2013).  This study was continued with the hope of 
exposing relationships between constructs as driven by the data of this particular sample.  
Further analysis was directed at matching the data with potential latent constructs without 
imposing any preconceived structure on the outcome (Child, 1990) with the vision to 
promote accurate changes to the measurement device, as has been previously suggested 
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by these similar studies of the EBI.  The primary objective of the continued study was to 
examine the relationships among constructs between epistemology and social influences 
as driven by this particular data set.  Since the CFA statistics generally showed poor 
model fit for this sample, additional objectives for this study became refining the 
measurement process and implying direction for future studies.  The resulting analyses 
are tailored for that purpose. 
Exploratory Factor Analyses 
EFA for the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory.  A Principal Component Analysis 
with Varimax rotation was used to explore the latent constructs of the EBI with the 
current sample.  This choice was made to emphasize the patterns emerging from the data 
in light of the poor model fit generated by the CFA (Brown, 2009). Using the literature 
review as a guiding framework, a five factor structure was explored first.  This was also 
consistent with the scree plot (Figure 4.2, below): 
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COMPONENT NUMBER 
Figure 4.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis Scree Plot for the EBI 
The measure passed the KMO (Kaiser & Rice, 1974) sampling adequacy test and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954).  To produce an accurate picture of the 
constructs of epistemological development for this project and in keeping with similar 
studies containing factor analyses on the topic (Schraw et al., 2002; Welch & Ray, 2013; 
Wheeler, 2007), a minimum of three items loading above .400 on each factor were held 
as restrictions.  The items were also required to have no cross-loading on another factor 
above .360. The first EFA produced four factors with the required loadings.  The fifth 
potential factor had two items loading above .400 with no significant cross-loadings.  
Both items EBI 18 (cross-loading at .379 on Factor 2 and at .448 on Factor 5) and EBI 23 
(cross-loading at .353 on Factor 1 and at .333 on Factor 5) were close to establishing 
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Factor 5 with the necessary third item. Because the EFA produced factors and loadings 
close to meeting the established requirements, low loading items were removed one by 
one to try to improve the fit of a new model.  Item EBI 22 loaded lowest on all factors 
(highest score .295 on Factor 5) and the EFA was performed again without that item first.  
Item EBI 7 (highest loading at .338 on Factor 4) was eliminated to try to reduce the cross-
loadings of other items, but the values didn’t change significantly.  The next non-
significant item, EBI 21 (highest loading .359 on Factor 1), was removed.  As a result, 
the lower value for item EBI 23 cross-loading on Factor 1 became insignificant and 
simultaneously, it elevated its loading on Factor 5.  The cross-loading on item EBI 18 
was improved, but still slightly significant.  Figure 4.3 on the following page shows the 
emerging five factor model with at least three items loading above .400 with no 
significant (above .360) cross-loadings.  The colors in the figure express a conceptual 
picture of how the items were originally hypothesized and then redistributed among new 
factors.  Tables A.1 – A.3 (Appendix A, pages 80 – 83) show this with more detail, 
including the factor loadings. 
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Figure 4.3.  Graphic representation of Exploratory Factor Analysis of the EBI including 
new factor structure and unused items 
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This figure captures the factor loadings gathering around five new components.  
These components are the gathering points for communality among the survey items.  
The data collected by the EBI in this sample drove an alternative factor model.  
Foundational to the results of the rest of the study, because it outlines how epistemic 
beliefs are gathering into particular elements around the data, Table A.2 in Appendix A 
on page 81 more specifically shows how the original questions of the EBI fit a new factor 
structure resulting from the EFA.  Reporting an alternative factor structure is consistent 
with other studies, such as Wheeler’s (2007) study which used the EBI to examine 
epistemic beliefs in order to compare them to a new measure for mathematics.  The five 
factor structure suggested by this EFA is similar to the original construct suggested by the 
first scholar to attempt to quantitatively measure epistemological beliefs, Marlene 
Schommer (1990).  However, the new model’s factor structure contains some important 
distinctions.  These distinctions are examined below.  
Factor 1, the Capacity for Knowledge is Innate (CKI), shares four of the original 
items intended for Schommer’s Innate Ability construct.  The additional item, EBI 3, 
“Students who learn things quickly are the most successful,” intended to target Quick 
Learning, contains language about learning capability and this may explain its connection 
to this new factor.  Each of the other items contain the words “smart” or “intellectual,” 
implying that intelligence is central to acquiring knowledge.  Item EBI 13, which fell out 
of the EFA with this sample, does imply Innate Ability, but it doesn’t specify 
intelligence, learning or knowledge and that may explain why it fails to load on this 
factor.  
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Factor 2, Knowledge is Acquired Quickly (KAQ), contains three of the original 
items aimed at Quick Learning.  The additional item, EBI 1, “Most things worth knowing 
are easy to understand” targeted Schommer’s Simple Knowledge construct, but loaded 
here on Factor 2.  Alternatively, EBI 9, which was intended to measure Quick Learning, 
loaded onto the new Factor 3, Knowledge is Simple. 
Factor 3, Knowledge is Simple (KS), is made up of three of the original items 
targeted at measuring the Simple Knowledge construct hypothesized by Schommer.  It 
also includes two additional items.  EBI 12 loaded on Factor 3 despite being originally 
aimed at measuring Certain Knowledge.  The question is double-barreled (Driscoll, 2011) 
in that it asks about what instructors should do and challenges the respondent to consider 
the differences between facts and theories and that may explain why it shifted.  The 
remaining item collecting on this factor, EBI 9, “If a person tries too hard to understand a 
problem they will most likely end up being confused” was aimed at measuring effort.  
However, since it is gathering with the other items forming Knowledge is Simple, this 
suggests that it was interpreted as having more to do with the difficult nature of the 
theoretical “problem” than a person’s effort to understand. 
All four items composing Factor 4, Authority is a Reliable Source of Knowledge 
(ARSK), aligned with their Omniscient Authority predecessors.  Interestingly, item EBI 
7, also targeted at Omniscient Authority, did not load highly enough on this or any other 
factor.   
Factor 5, Knowledge is Certain (KC), is composed of three original items targeted 
at Certain Knowledge. 
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Of the seven items that either contained cross-loading or low loading values, three 
were targeted for Certain Knowledge.  Two of these, EBI 2 and EBI 18, contained 
language about absolute truth and relative opinion.  The third, EBI 21, is the only item to 
contain wording referring to a particular school subject.  It, along with EBI 7, also 
received low loadings in Wheeler’s (2007) study. 
EFA for the Social Influences Survey.  For consistency, the process used for the 
EBI EFA, a Principal Components Analysis with a Varimax rotation, was used for the 
SIS EFA.  Other options were considered, but this choice was also made to emphasize the 
patterns emerging from the data (Brown, 2009).  The Exploratory Factor Analysis for the 
SIS produced the factors and loadings as shown in Table A.4 (Appendix A, page 83).  
Three factors were forced on the initial test in compliance with the theory on social 
influences and in accordance with the scree plot (Figure 4.4, below): 
Figure 4.4.  Exploratory Factor Analysis Scree Plot for the Social Influences Survey 
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The measure passed the KMO (Kaiser & Rice, 1974) sampling adequacy test and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954).  The minimum factor loading (.400) and 
cross-loading (.360) values were retained as qualifiers for consistency’s sake.  Item SIS 8 
loaded lowest on all factors (highest loading .320).  Item SIS 9 loaded poorly as well (-
.340 on factor 3).  Item SIS16 cross-loaded lowly on Factor 1 (.382) and moderately on 
Factor 3 (.570).  The EFA was performed again without SIS 8 and SIS 9 and this reduced 
the lower value cross-loading on SIS 16 to (.355) and increased its loading onto Factor 3 
to .617, creating an acceptable level of difference.  Figure 4.5 on the following page 
demonstrates an acceptable factor structure based on these bounds.  Using a color 
scheme, the figure also conceptually captures the way in which the originally targeted 
items gathered around new factors.  A more detailed outline of this distribution is 
captured in Tables A.4 – A.6 (Appendix A, pages 83, 84). 
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Figure 4.5.  Graphic representation of Exploratory Factor Analysis of the SIS including 
new factor structure and unused items 
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These data suggest that three concepts underlie the responses to the SIS for this 
sample, which is important in exploring answers to the original research question 
regarding the relationship between social influences and epistemic beliefs and offering 
insight for the new objective of suggesting improved measurement and potential future 
study.  Some preliminary reasoning is presented as to why these factors are being 
suggested by the data, but the significance of the resulting new factors will be 
commented on more thoroughly in the Discussion section of the dissertation.  Table A.5 
(Appendix A, pages 83, 84) more specifically shows how the original questions of the 
SIS showed communality among three latent components.  These are Factor 1: Social 
Accord, Factor 2: Potential Loss of Sense of Community (PLSC), and Factor 3: Naiveté 
of Attachment to Personal Community (NAPC).  Differentiation between the items and 
their factor loadings seem to fall along lines of proximity.  Those loading on Factor 1 
deal with more distal social influences, while those loading on Factor 2 and Factor 3 
primarily result from proximal relationships, which is evocative of Bronfenbrenner’s 
Bioecological Model (1994).  Social Accord has been selected to describe the first 
construct and designate the communality between the items loading on this component.  
The name attempts to capture the way in which the items loading on this factor are 
characterized by social influences originating from more distant agents.  The newly 
named Factor 2, Potential Loss of Sense of Community (PLSC), contained three of the 
items originally targeted for the Potential Loss construct.  The fourth item was originally 
targeted at Authority.  Factor 2 and Factor 3 are related in their expression of the 
influence of proximal processes.  Both explore the power of influence of the 
microsystem.  However, Factor 2 focuses on the potential loss of community and Factor 
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3, Naiveté of Attachment to Personal Community (NAPC), is centered on the sense of 
attachment students ascribe to their proximal relationships.  Two of the items gathering 
around Factor 3 were originally targeted for the Attachment construct.  The third was 
directed at Potential Loss, which could be experienced as the result of sacrificing parental 
investment.  However, the question could have easily been read as the student’s sense of 
attachment resulting from parental investment.  Attachment to people active in the 
microsystem of the student is a common thread in the items loading on Factor 3. 
Of the unused items, three were originally targeted for the hypothesized Authority 
factor.  The data shows that this concept seems to have dropped out of the social 
influences construct and fits better with the epistemic beliefs construct, Authority is a 
Reliable Source of Knowledge. 
Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Upon reaching a plausible model and in keeping with the research strategy, 
subscales were introduced to calculate potential statistical relationships between 
epistemic beliefs and social influences.  Iterations were run for each of the subscales to 
check for multicolinearity.  The highest VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) value was 1.55, 
so it is unlikely there was multcolinearity among both EBI and SIS subscales. 
For each new epistemic belief factor, a stepwise regression was performed to 
determine significant relationships between each and the social influences factors, all 
resulting from the EFA.  In each reported case, the Durbin Watson (Durbin & Watson, 
1950, 1951) values fell within acceptable ranges, signifying no autocorrelation.  Each 
ANOVA was significant indicating the regression is likely a valid model.  Tolerance 
levels fell above 0.20 indicating insignificant multicolinearity.  The histograms, P-Plots, 
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Regression Standardized Predicted Values all passed the eye-test indicating likely 
acceptable levels of normality and heteroskedasticity.  A more detailed analysis of the 
statistics emerging from all five stepwise regressions is presented in Tables A.8 – A.12 
(Appendix A, pages 86, 87).  The relationships that proved to be statistically significant 
are included in Table 4.4 below:  
Table 4.4 
Statistically Significant Stepwise Multiple Regression Results 
EBI New Factor Modifying Factors (SIS) 
Corre-
lations 
R 
Square 
ANOVA 
(sig) 
Betas* 
Authority is a 
Reliable Source of 
Knowledge 
Social Accord 
Naiveté Attachment 
-.480 
-.342 
0.23 
0.27 
.000 
.000 
-0.41 
-0.21 
Knowledge is 
Certain 
Social Accord 
Naiveté Attachment 
-.423 
-.276 
0.18 
0.20 .000 
-0.37 
-0.16 
Knowledge is 
Acquired Quickly Potential Loss -.185 0.03 .000 -0.19 
Knowledge is 
Simple 
Social Accord 
Potential Loss 
-.142 
-.134 
0.02 
0.03 
.006 
.003 
-0.12 
-0.11 
Capacity for 
Knowledge is 
Innate 
Social Accord -.134 0.02 .010 -0.13 
*Betas Standardized
 As predicted, some social influences factors held negative relationships with 
epistemological factors, which provided some insight to the research question of this 
study.  This is represented both by the correlations and stepwise process.  Generally 
speaking, students with higher SIS values scored lower on EBI constructs and students 
who scored higher on EBI factors scored lower on SIS constructs.  More specifically, the 
regression model determined that Social Accord and Naiveté of Attachment to Personal 
Community together account for 27.1% of the variability in responses to questions 
dealing with Authority is a Reliable Source of Knowledge. This variability, along with 
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the negative correlations, loosely implies that students who have a firm sense of 
belonging within broader social contexts also have a deeper sense of reliance upon 
authority for informing their epistemology.  Students with a strong dependence upon 
authority also held significant Naiveté of Attachment to Personal Community values in 
the study.  Social Accord and Naiveté of Attachment to Personal Community also 
accounted for 20.2% of the variability in responses to items common to Knowledge is 
Certain.  This implies that students potentially hold more tightly to norms imposed by 
both peer and family influences and more remote environmental agencies and that these 
norms may include beliefs about confidence in knowing.  This indicates that there are 
social influences at work providing obstacles to epistemological development and that 
conversely; students with generally more mature epistemologies are not as restricted by 
their social influences.  Other negative relationships were revealed, but they only 
accounted for small amounts of variability.  
Several hypothesized relationships were non-significant, according to the 
regression model.  In particular, it is interesting that Potential Loss and Naiveté of 
Attachment were relevant to particular EBI constructs and not significant for all of them.  
It is also interesting that Social Accord was more strongly related to each epistemic belief 
construct except Knowledge is Acquired Quickly.  Reasoning for these relationships is 
explored more fully in the Discussion chapter. 
Hierarchical Multiple Regressions 
In keeping with the intention of the study to examine the predictive ability of 
social influences above and beyond the variance created by the demographic variables, 
additional regressions were also run hierarchically.  These were performed separately 
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with each of the five epistemic beliefs constructs as the unique dependent variable.   The 
data set used for the hierarchical regression reflects the removal of cases related to small 
demographic populations and missing values (total sample size is 343). 
The regression results show that adding the SIS subscale means to the model 
increased the model’s ability to predict each epistemic belief factor above and beyond the 
demographic variables.  A more detailed presentation of each hierarchical regression 
appears in Tables A.13 – A.17 (Appendix A, pages 87 – 91).  Table 4.5 shows the R 
Square Change values which indicate the strength of the model’s predictive capacity 
beyond the demographic variables:  
Table 4.5 
Statistically Significant Hierarchical Regression Results 
Epistemic Belief Factor R Square (demographic) 
R Square 
(SIS Factors) 
R Square 
Change 
Authority is a Reliable 
Source of Knowledge 0.04 0.30 0.27 
Knowledge is Certain 0.02 0.25 0.23 
Knowledge is Acquired 
Quickly 0.03 0.08 0.05 
Knowledge is Simple 0.03 0.08 0.04 
Capacity for Knowledge 
is Innate 0.03 0.06 0.03 
Statistically, the SIS subscale means produced the strongest relationship above 
and beyond demographics with the Authority is a Reliable Source of Knowledge 
construct, increasing the percentage of variance accounted for in the model by 26.6 %.  
All three SIS subscale mean scores produced significant negative relationships with the 
ARSK construct.  Additionally, the statistical relationship between the Knowledge is 
Certain EBI subscale means and the SIS subscale means proved to be the second 
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strongest result from the five hierarchical regressions.  Above and beyond the effects of 
the demographic variables, which proved to be statistically insignificant when taken 
collectively, adding the SIS subscale means solidified the model’s predictive capacity to 
predict a student’s belief in Knowledge is Certain in a statistically significant way and is 
increasing the percentage of variance accounted for by 22.6%. 
The Standardized Betas from the models support the negative correlations as 
reported in the stepwise regression results.  Overall, higher scores on the EBI factor 
subscales were significantly associated with lower scores on the SIS subscales.  The 
converse also holds true: that lower EBI factor means are associated with higher SIS 
subscale means.  For clarity, it should be noted that high scores on an EBI subscale 
theoretically indicate that a student is more mature in their development and believes less 
strongly in that simplistic concept of knowledge.  Furthermore, low scores on the EBI 
factors generally designate a less mature epistemological development and a stronger 
belief in the particular construct (Schraw et al., 2002).  Therefore, given that the factor 
structures are somewhat unstable, it can be generally asserted that there is potential for 
social influences to predict epistemic beliefs.  This confirms the importance of improved 
measurement and continued study on the topic. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
The following discussion centers on both the original research question and the 
new objectives that emerged from the data analysis.  Regarding the research question, 
focus will be placed on how the data brings conversation to the relationship between 
social influences and epistemic beliefs.  The first discussion will focus on the ways 
constructs emerged from the factor analyses.  Once possibilities regarding these factors 
have been expressed, the results from the regression analyses drive conversation about 
the relationships between them.  Finally, in response to the factor analyses producing 
acceptable, but less than desirable loadings, suggestions for future measurement and 
potential future study topics will be discussed. 
The Relationships Between Social Influences and Epistemic Beliefs 
Implications of the factor analyses. 
Social influences and authority.  As a result of previous studies on the EBI, the 
Omniscient Authority construct was expected to prove troublesome in the EBI CFA and 
emerge as a solid factor from the SIS EFA.  The statistics from the EFA show that it 
actually fit better within the EBI structure and fell out of the SIS.  This implies that in 
terms of epistemic beliefs, Authority as a Reliable Source of Knowledge should be 
distinguished from the nature of authority as a social influence.  It is significant to 
remember that Schommer conceived of development along a continuum between relying 
on authority as a source of knowledge and personally constructed beliefs about 
knowledge (DeBacker et al., 2008).  This established that student growth was equated 
with the self-authorship of epistemic beliefs.  The analysis supports that authorities are 
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considered sources of knowledge, but serve a dual role as influential social agents.  This 
second role seems to operate within both communal and larger societal systems, as 
reflected by the originally conceived Authority construct being absorbed into the newly 
observed SIS factors.  The SIS EFA suggests that these authorities as relational 
influences are more accurately measured by their effects as operators within the factors 
Social Accord, Naiveté of Attachment to Personal Community, and Potential Loss of 
Personal Community.  Clearly, these dual roles should be measured and analyzed 
separately.  Maintaining this distinction may improve future studies of epistemic beliefs 
and social influences.  Greater insight into the epistemological development change 
process will likely be gained as authority as source of knowledge is explored and its 
function as a relational influence within community and culture is separately clarified. 
It is of interest that the majority of items that fell out of the EFA of the SIS shared 
this theoretical connection.  It is possible that other social influence factors could exist 
and such data justifies explorations of other potential contextual inhibitors to the 
developmental process. 
  Social influences and the Bioecological Model.  The Bioecological Model 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1994) has informed the shaping of new constructs emerging from the 
EFA of the Social Influences Survey.  The emergence of the new factor, Social Accord, 
brought attention to the idea that SIS factors divided along the lines of immediacy.  
Results from this study show that maintaining social cohesion through one’s epistemic 
beliefs is a likely moderator in epistemological growth.  A further question to explore is 
whether or not, or more likely, to what degree, can one take on an expanded view of 
beliefs without losing connection with one’s broader social context.  Generally, the 
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differences in the originally hypothesized and newly formed constructs could be 
characterized by their proximity to the student.  Bronfenbrenner (1994) hypothesizes that 
proximal processes – those closest to the student – have the most impact on development. 
The results of the SIS have inadvertently brought the significance of these relationships 
to light.  Family, friends, and local communities are integral parts of the Potential Loss 
and Naïveté of Attachment factors and those expressed by items connected to Social 
Accord are related to more remote societal influences such as religious, racial, and 
potential romantic partners (distinctively, I am assuming the difference between potential 
romantic partners from actual ones).   While these are certainly significant, they are less 
embodied locally.  This is to say that their processes of influence are not necessarily less 
personal, but much less firsthand.  When describing proximal processes, Bronfenbrenner 
(1994) notes the significance of constantly active interactions.  Those relationships that 
are more central to person’s daily life, those that they most frequently interact with, are 
the most influential.  Interestingly, Social Accord produced consistent, significant results 
among all of the epistemic belief categories.  As a result, its importance in future studies 
of the epistemological developmental process should be maintained and possibly even 
explored as a control variable.  Based on the results of the study, it could be argued that 
societal pressures embodied in distal agents are highly significant.  However, keeping the 
Bioecological Model in mind, it is likely these pressures to hold onto epistemic beliefs 
espoused by at-large social agencies may be expressed through proximal relationships as 
well.  It would be interesting to explore how distal pressure to maintain epistemic beliefs 
is being communicated to students.  
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Evidence for cultural socialization also exists from social psychological studies.  
Pizzolato and her co-authors (2012) note one of which that claimed “the community’s 
idea of what it means to be a person (in terms of culturally shaped notions of how to be in 
relationships) is key to understanding how people understand the concept of self” 
(Markus, Mullaly, & Kitayama, 1997).  These key community influences shaped 
solidarity through identification.  In terms of this study, the factors resulting from the 
EFA of the SIS could be interpreted as reflecting these relational dynamics.  The 
formation and alteration of epistemic beliefs is mired in communal influence.  
Understanding the way development happens is kindred with understanding the 
exchanges of proximal relationships and less-proximal social agents.  Further 
distinguishing survey items along the lines of proximity to the student may improve the 
measurement of social influences.  This in turn may lead to strengthening conclusions 
about epistemological development and ultimately, educational strategies.  
Potential Loss of Sense of Community.  As a result of the factor analysis, the 
originally conceived Potential Loss construct was further differentiated to include losing 
a sense of community.  This is mainly a result of the fourth SIS item “I grew up in a strict 
environment”, which was incipiently targeted at Authority, potentially being interpreted 
by students for its emphasis on family.  Originally intended to help evaluate the strength 
of authority in a student’s life, it may have actually measured the comfort level attributed 
to a strict upbringing.  In other words, losing the comfort of having decisions made for 
students by their parents may be at stake in this question rather than the power of 
authority in one’s life.  The emotional connection of that relationship and its closeness to 
the student has potentially been more readily interpreted by those who took the survey.  
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Pizzolato and her co-authors (2012) produced evidence in interviews that such 
relationships theoretically take on more psychological significance, making it more 
difficult for students to become self-authors.  These influences can be embodied in on-
campus relationships and even contribute to the dissonance at hand during provocative 
moments.  These authors also emphasize that epistemological development can be 
equated with how well a student manages her social influences as she becomes more 
aware of them.  Future measurements of social influences may take advantage of the 
clarity brought to this dynamic from this study.  Items targeting ways in which a student 
is both aware of and manipulates the emotions surrounding beliefs about knowledge and 
their sense of belonging in a larger community may enhance both statistical and 
conceptual analysis. 
Implications of the regression results.  The regression models show that 
epistemic beliefs are negatively related to social influences.  The hierarchical regression 
results emphasize that this is indeed the case above and beyond demographic variance.  
While the weakness of the loadings of the factor analyses can challenge overt claims 
about the nuances of this relationship, it generally exists.  There is evidence that students 
with tighter ties to their social influences are also more likely to resist change in 
epistemic beliefs.  Conversely, students who have weaker ties to their social influences 
change more readily. 
Based on the stepwise regression evidence, students who believe more strongly 
that Authority is a Reliable Source of Knowledge also have stronger connections to 
Social Accord and exhibit more Naiveté of Attachment to Personal Community.  These 
two social influences constructs were also related to Knowledge is Certain.  These 
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relationships proved statistically significant, but because of the weak factor analysis, 
distinct claims about the specifics of these relationships should be avoided.  Therefore, 
continued research is recommended to determine the interplay of these constructs.  This 
research should focus on which information outlets are serving as sources of authority.  
Future studies could also work to expand our understanding of what types of agents are 
functioning to influence Social Accord and how the relationships between students and 
agents function.  Because of the strong statistical relationship, there are likely key 
connections to be explored between sources of authority, communication styles, remote 
social interactions, and beliefs about the simplicity and certainty of knowledge claims. 
A statistically significant relationship was shown between the Knowledge is 
Acquired Quickly and Potential Loss of Sense of Community constructs.  The connection 
may be attributed to a general attitude of path of least resistance, or reward without risk.  
Evidence for this can be found in the thematic similarity of item composition within these 
factors.  Many of the questions within the PLSC construct are questions of threat and 
high responses on the subscale may indicate a reticence to risk.  Similarly, items within 
the KAQ construct suggest that acquisition has less to do with knowing and is more about 
effort.  Logically, it seems students with a greater fear of loss of relationships may also be 
less risky and this may impact their attitude toward discovering knowledge.  Future 
measurement devices could use items to differentiate study habits and risk/reward 
scenarios, and delve further into the nature of loss as it concerns changing epistemic 
beliefs. The data shows that the connection is significant, although less than strong, so 
deeper conclusions about this relationship would need to be explored more carefully. 
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Limitations 
The results of the current study are subject to some limitations.  The sample was 
drawn from a medium-large Southeastern university.  Although it was random and 
approximately representative of the population in terms of race, the sample was 
predominately white (85%) and the sample populations for racial groups were small.  The 
sample was also predominantly female (73%) and not representative of the population 
(estimated 56% female).  These sample characteristics should be considered when 
interpreting the findings of the current study. 
While every effort was made to produce reliable factor analyses, the analyses 
produced loadings that were less than desirable.  This study indicates that theory and 
subsequent anticipated constructs and of epistemic beliefs and social influences should 
continue to be clarified and pursued.  While this is consistent with other epistemological 
studies, these limitations should be kept in mind. 
Implications for Measurement 
The factor analyses suggest that the original concepts of both epistemic beliefs 
and social influences prove problematic for quantitative analysis.  While new factor 
structures were composed based on statistical results, they also contained less than 
desirable loadings.  Such results echo previous studies which suggested the EBI was a 
dubious measurement device that needed fine tuning (Welch & Ray, 2013).  The current 
study, because of its exploratory nature, attempted to use the EBI in its traditional form to 
maintain consistency with the literature.  This consistency legitimizes the results to a 
degree, but it also limits the strength of the implications of the study for higher education 
because of the limitations of the EBI.  As a result, the more powerful conclusions about 
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the study center on clarifications among concepts for future measurement.  Furthermore, 
conclusions have also been limited to emphasizing only the stronger relationships among 
new factors.  While these are certainly beneficial, improved measures for epistemic 
beliefs and social influences could more significantly impact strategies for higher 
education.  The results of this study have revealed a deeper need for progressing toward 
more accurate measurement devices. 
Based on the way EBI items spread among the originally intended constructs and 
the new factors, more clearly distinguishing the nature of epistemic beliefs would help 
produce a more robust factor structure.  Evidence shows that students seemed to interpret 
questions in regard to learning rather than beliefs about knowledge, noted particularly by 
the cross-loadings and low loadings aimed at the original Certain Knowledge construct.  
This is easy to understand, given the way concepts like certainty, simplicity, knowledge 
acquisition, and the Speed of Knowledge (Schommer, 1990) have a role in the learning 
process.  While it may not be advisable to completely remove ideas about learning from 
the constructs of epistemology, these need to be more clearly defined or queried about.  
For instance, item, EBI 1, “Most things worth knowing are easy to understand”, targeted 
Schommer’s Simple Knowledge construct and the word, “easy”, could have been 
interpreted as having to do with acquiring knowledge rather than naming its simple or 
complex nature, and as such loaded on the new Factor 2, Knowledge is Acquired 
Quickly.  Conversely, EBI 9, which was intended to measure Quick Learning, loaded 
onto the new Factor 3, Knowledge is Certain, and may have been interpreted to suggest 
the difficult nature of the information itself rather than the ability to learn it quickly.  
Words like “understand” and “confused” may have directed students toward thinking 
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about simplicity of the concept at hand rather than how quickly it could be learned.  The 
EFA raises questions about how students differentiated between the nature of knowledge 
and the processes of learning.  Authors of future measurement devices should use clearly 
established theories on these topics and be careful to intentionally ask about the two 
processes in ways that can be differentiated. 
Social influences and authority.  Since this study has clarified the role of 
authority as a source of knowledge rather than a social influence, it is suggested that 
concepts like parental influence and peer pressure fit better within the SIS under the 
domain of ties to personal community.  Future measures might include items focused on 
keeping these two aspects of authority distinct.  The resulting measurement devices may 
more accurately establish social influences constructs focused on the significance of loss 
and attachment rather than on authority. 
Renewed emphasis on Social Accord.  While emerging as a new concept from 
the factor analysis of the SIS, Social Accord accounted for the strongest negative 
relationship with epistemic beliefs almost unilaterally throughout the study.  In 
considering modifications to measurement, more attention should be paid to this factor of 
social influences.  Since the construct includes items that mention religion and race 
tangentially, these sources of beliefs should be further explored.  Other potential social 
institutions or agents that operate more remotely from students, such as political figures, 
counselors, or teachers could also be examined to determine if they additionally 
contribute to a Social Accord construct.  Because of the manifestation of significant 
differences in the effects between proximal processes and more remote socialization, 
future studies can make use of these distinctions.  In particular, studies could examine 
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larger cultural forces such as religion, race, and other values-creating systems and their 
interplay with epistemic beliefs formation.  Insight is likely to be gathered from the way 
values about knowledge are communicated through each of the ecological systems – 
micro, meso, exo, and macro.  Exploring each of these environments individually could 
unearth keys to the ways in which students wrestle with the interplay of relationships, 
socialization, and epistemological doubt.  Of the conclusions to be drawn from this 
project, the data supports that further examination into the construct of Social Accord as a 
social influence is the most warranted. 
Terminology.  Some of the confusion surrounding factor loadings could be the 
result of using controversial and often misunderstood terms.  Based on the way items 
containing words like “facts”, “theories”, “understand”, “truth”, and “opinion” shifted or 
fell out of the factor analysis, it appears they may have added to the ambiguity of the 
results of the survey.  However, these are terms associated with epistemology and 
learning processes.  It would be tempting to simply remove these types of enigmatic and 
controversial words to see if they produced better factor loadings.  The challenge is to 
find more specific item wording, yet also retain the important concepts these terms 
represent.  A potential solution is to operationalize the meanings of these words in an 
introduction to a future survey.  In such a case, researchers could establish clear 
discussion points based on how the results verified, modified, or contradicted a particular 
representation of the terms. 
Conclusion 
The factor loadings that emerged from the study proved to be less than optimal.  
However, the resulting factor structure driven by this sample did produce consistent 
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statistically significant relationships.  Analyzing these connections and measurement 
limitations has produced worthwhile insight that can be applied to future considerations 
for study.  The constructs have been clarified, which has produced a small gain in 
understanding what could be occurring during the change process of epistemological 
development.  It is clear that proximal relationships have a different impact than more 
distant ones.  Those shaping broader social contexts also have more significant ties to 
authority as a source of knowledge.  Less insight was gathered about attachment and fear 
of loss of community, but because the results revealed that social influences do affect the 
development of epistemic beliefs, further research is needed to clarify how these 
constructs are operating together.   
This investigation was initially conceived with the hope of informing higher 
education practice about potential applications that may emerge from exploring the 
relationship between social influences and epistemological development.  Although the 
statistics accumulated show that more is needed to be discovered to achieve that goal in 
specific ways, some evidence for the value of examining the interplay between these 
constructs has emerged.  Greater understanding for what students are experiencing as 
they change and grow will accompany researchers as we continue to wrestle with the 
significance of epistemological development for education.  Simple understanding can 
ease student transitions, but additional clarification is needed to fully implement changes 
in practice.  The accrued data has revealed that continued exploratory analysis is required 
to move closer toward application to higher education.  This study is an example of a 
necessary step in that process. 
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Appendix A 
Detailed Statistical Tables 
Table A.1: Final EFA Factor Loadings for the EBI 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
EBI24 .698 .022 .146 -.096 .149 
EBI3 .667 .116 -.087 .041 -.017 
EBI8 .649 -.090 .136 .054 -.035 
EBI14 .620 .224 -.018 .066 -.020 
EBI5 .607 .111 -.051 -.166 .092 
EBI15 .348 .659 .198 -.055 -.008 
EBI20 .142 .639 .170 .014 .052 
EBI27 .184 .634 .293 .079 .028 
EBI2 .108 -.499 -.104 -.051 .424 
EBI13 .270 -.482 .378 .087 -.003 
EBI1 .019 .429 .149 .201 .260 
EBI10 -.035 .209 .688 .158 -.032 
EBI12 .002 .087 .637 .082 .228 
EBI17 -.042 .173 .588 .121 .091 
EBI9 -.013 .265 .517 -.042 -.139 
EBI11 .078 -.002 .516 -.019 -.033 
EBI16 .409 -.042 .447 -.003 -.137 
EBI26 -.012 .209 .081 .754 .163 
EBI25 .057 -.190 .026 .745 -.196 
EBI4 -.055 .115 .086 .719 .105 
EBI19 -.130 -.047 .111 .599 .255 
EBI7 .256 .129 -.063 .332 .281 
EBI28 -.132 .045 -.102 .012 .734 
EBI6 -.008 -.256 .155 .253 .605 
EBI18 .190 .382 .184 .071 .476 
EBI23 .250 .236 -.050 .211 .439 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
Key:      loading significantly 
       on a factor 
     significantly cross-loading 
      on at least two values 
      (absolute value .360 and higher) 
loading lowly (below .400) 
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Table A.2:  
EFA EBI Component Characteristics 
Item Question Intended Factor Component Loading 
EBI 
24 
Smart people are born that 
way. 
Innate 
Ability 
Capacity for 
Knowledge is 
Innate 
.698 
EBI 3 
Students who learn things 
quickly are the most 
successful. 
Quick 
Learning .667 
EBI 8 
Really smart students don’t 
have to work as hard to do 
well in school. 
Innate 
Ability .649 
EBI 
14 
How well you do in school 
depends on how smart you 
are. 
Innate 
Ability .620 
EBI 5 People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth. 
Innate 
Ability .607 
EBI 
15 
If you don’t learn 
something quickly, you 
won’t ever learn it. 
Quick 
Learning 
Knowledge is 
Acquired Quickly .659 
EBI 
20 
If you haven’t understood a 
chapter the first time 
through, going back over it 
won’t help. 
Quick 
Learning .639 
EBI 
27 
Working on a problem 
with no quick solution is a 
waste of time 
Quick 
Learning .634 
EBI 1 Most things worth knowing are easy to understand. 
Simple 
Knowledge .429 
EBI 
10 
Too many theories just 
complicate things. 
Simple 
Knowledge 
Knowledge is 
Simple .688 
EBI 
12 
Instructors should focus on 
facts instead of theories. 
Certain 
Knowledge .637 
EBI 
17 
Things are simpler than 
most professors would 
have you believe. 
Simple 
Knowledge .588 
EBI 9 
If a person tries too hard to 
understand a problem, they 
will most likely end up 
being confused. 
Quick 
Learning .517 
EBI 
11 
The best ideas are often the 
most simple. 
Simple 
Knowledge .516 
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EBI 
26 
People shouldn’t question 
authority. 
Omniscient 
Authority 
Authority is a 
Reliable Source of 
Knowledge 
.754 
EBI 
25 
When someone in authority 
tells me what to do, I 
usually do it. 
Omniscient 
Authority .745 
EBI 4 People should always obey the law. 
Omniscient 
Authority .719 
EBI 
19 
Children should be allowed 
to question their parents’ 
authority. 
Omniscient 
Authority .599 
EBI 
28 
Sometimes there are no 
right answers to life’s 
bigger problems. 
Certain 
Knowledge 
Knowledge is 
Certain .734 
EBI 6 Absolute moral truth does not exist. 
Certain 
Knowledge .605 
EBI 
23 
What is true today will be 
true tomorrow. 
Certain 
Knowledge 
.439 
Table A.3 
Unused items for the EFA on the EBI 
Item Question Targeted 
Construct 
Issue 
EBI 
22 
The more you know about a 
topic, the more there is to 
know. 
Simple 
Knowledge 
Loaded low across all factors 
(.295) 
EBI 7 
Parents should teach children 
all there is to know about 
life. 
Omniscient 
Authority 
Loaded low across all factors 
(.338) 
EBI 
21 
Science is easy to understand 
because it contains so many 
facts. 
Certain 
Knowledge 
Loaded low across all factors 
(.359) 
EBI 2 What is true is a matter of opinion. 
Certain 
Knowledge 
Cross-loaded on Factors 2 & 5 
EBI 
13 
Some people are born with 
special gifts and talents. 
Innate 
Ability 
Cross-loaded on Factors 2 & 3 
EBI 
16 
Some people just have a 
knack for learning and others 
don't. 
Innate 
Ability 
Cross-loaded on Factors 1 & 3 
EBI 
18 
If two people are arguing 
about something, at least one 
of them must be wrong. 
Certain 
Knowledge 
Cross-loaded on Factors 2 & 5 
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Table A.4 
Final EFA Factor Loadings for the SIS 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Component 
1 2 3 
SIS10 .673 .205 .042 
SIS6 .635 .196 .342 
SIS14 .608 -.159 -.211 
SIS11 .606 .142 .170 
SIS13 .442 .067 .146 
SIS5 .061 .713 -.217 
SIS7 -.011 .650 .121 
SIS12 .473 .604 -.115 
SIS4 .191 .540 .077 
SIS2 .044 .428 .112 
SIS3 -.011 .148 .725 
SIS16 .355 -.233 .617 
SIS15 -.122 .414 .580 
SIS1 .209 -.057 .527 
Table A.5 
EFA SIS Component Characteristics 
Item Question Intended Construct Component Score 
SIS 10 I defer to religious leaders when I think about truth Authority Social Accord .673 
SIS 6 
I make sure my dating 
partners have the same beliefs 
as me. 
Loss .635 
SIS 14 
As a result of my experiences 
travelling in other cultures, I 
adjusted my beliefs. 
Attachment .608 
SIS 11 
I feel a strong attachment 
toward my own racial/ethnic 
group 
Attachment .606 
Extraction Method:  
Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
Key:      loading significantly 
       on a factor 
     significantly cross-loading 
      on at least two values 
    (absolute value .360 and higher) 
loading lowly (below .400) 
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SIS 13 I rarely have doubts about my lifestyle or beliefs Attachment .442 
SIS 5 
If I accepted a person of 
difference, it would cause 
conflict with my family. 
Loss 
Potential Loss of 
Sense of 
Community 
.713 
SIS 7 I grew up in a strict environment Authority .650 
SIS 4 
If I changed my mind about 
my beliefs, I’d lose a lot of 
friends. 
Loss .540 
SIS 2 
I feel threatened when 
challenged by new people or 
ideas. 
Loss .428 
SIS 3 My parents have a lot invested in me. Loss 
Naiveté of 
Attachment to 
Personal 
Community 
.725 
SIS 16 
When I have doubts about my 
beliefs or lifestyle, I talk to 
people at home about them. 
Attachment .617 
SIS 1 I was/am part of a close-knit community where I grew up. Attachment .527 
Table A.6 
Unused Items for the EFA on the SIS 
Item Question Intended 
Construct 
Issue 
SIS 8 
Sometimes you have to 
accept answers from teachers 
even if you don’t understand 
them. 
Authority 
Highest loading was .320 
SIS 9 Learning depends most on having a good teacher. Authority 
Highest loading was -.340 
SIS 12 
I feel threatened when 
challenged by new people or 
ideas. 
Loss 
Cross-loaded on Factors 1 & 2 
SIS 15 
My parents were/are heavily 
involved in my college 
decision 
Authority 
Cross-loaded on Factors 2 & 3 
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Table A.7 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all subscales (N = 370) 
Variables ARSK KC KS KAQ CKI SA PLSC NAPC 
Authority Is a Reliable 
Source of Knowledge 
(ARSK) 
1 
Knowledge 
Is Certain (KC) .31*** 1 
Knowledge 
Is Simple (KS) .19*** .07 1 
Knowledge Is 
Acquired Quickly 
(KAQ) 
.17*** .13* .41*** 1 
The Capacity for 
Knowledge Is Innate 
(CKI) 
.05 .28*** .12* .33*** 1 
Social Accord (SA) -.48*** -.42*** -.14** -.9 -.13** 1 
Potential Loss of 
Sense of Community 
(PLSC) 
-.16** .001 -.13** -.19*** -.09 .22*** 1 
Naïveté of Attachment 
to Personal 
Community (NAPC) 
-.34*** -.28*** -.10 .05 -.001 .31*** .031 1 
Means 3.34 3.98 3.38 4.83 4.26 3.50 2.63 4.13 
Standard Deviations 0.84 0.93 0.78 0.68 0.80 0.91 0.79 0.98 
Range 4.75 5.00 4.40 4.00 4.00 4.40 4.50 5.00 
Note: *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.00 
Table A.8 
Stepwise Regression Model of Authority Is a Reliable Source of Knowledge 
R R2 B SE β t 
Step 1 0.48 0.23*** 
Social Accord -.44 .04 -.48*** -10.49 
Step 2 0.52 0.27*** 
Social Accord -.38 .04 -.41*** -8.82 
Naivete of Attachment -.18 .04 -.21*** -4.54 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table A.9 
Stepwise Regression Model of Knowledge Is Certain 
R R2 B SE β t 
Step 1 0.42 0.18*** 
Social Accord -.43 .05 -.42*** -8.95 
Step 2 0.45 0.20*** 
Social Accord -.38 .05 -.37*** -7.60 
Naiveté of Attachment -.15 .05 -.16*** -3.25 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table A.10 
Stepwise Regression Model of Knowledge Is Simple 
R R2 B SE β t 
Step 1 0.14 .02** 
Social Accord -.12 .04 -.14** -2.75 
Step 2 0.18 .03** 
Social Accord -.10 .05 -.12* -2.24 
Potential Loss -.11 .05 -.11* -2.05 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table A.11 
Stepwise Regression Model of Knowledge Is Acquired Quickly 
R R2 B SE β t 
Step 1 0.19 0.03*** 
Potential Loss -.16 .04 -.19*** -3.61 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table A.12 
Stepwise Regression Model of The Capacity for Knowledge Is Innate 
R R2 B SE β t 
Step 1 0.13 .02** 
Social Accord -.12 .05 -.13** -2.59 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table A.13 
Hierarchical Regression Model of Authority Is a Reliable Source of Knowledge 
R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 0.19 0.04 
Urban/Rural/Suburban .001 .51 .001 0.02 
Gender -.24 .10 -.13* -2.37 
Mother Education -.09 .06 -.10 -1.59 
Father Education .07 .05 .08 1.26 
Multiracial -.10 .20 -.03 -0.52 
Race .06 .04 .09 1.57 
Major .02 .02 .05 0.97 
Step 2 0.55 0.30*** 0.27*** 
Urban/Rural/Suburban -.05 .05 -.05 -1.15 
Gender -.17 .09 -.09 -1.91 
Mother Education -.01 .05 -.01 -0.21 
Father Education .06 .05 .07 1.28 
Multiracial .02 .17 .01 0.18 
Race .03 .03 .04 0.82 
Major .02 .02 .06 1.19 
Social Accord -.38 .05 -.40*** -7.98
Potential Loss -.07 .05 -.07 -1.39 
Naïveté Attachment -.19 .04 -.22*** -4.32
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table A.14 
Hierarchical Regression Model of Knowledge Is Certain 
R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 0.14 0.02 
Urban/Rural/Suburban -.03 .06 -.02 -0.43 
Gender .07 .12 .03 0.58 
Mother Education -.14 .06 -.13* -2.10 
Father Education .02 .06 .02 0.38 
Multiracial -.24 .22 -.06 -1.09 
Race .01 .04 -.01 -0.17 
Major -.004 .02 -.01 -0.20 
Step 2 0.50 0.25*** 0.23*** 
Urban/Rural/Suburban -.09 .05 -.08 -1.66 
Gender .13 .10 .06 1.31 
Mother Education -.05 .06 -.05 -0.88 
Father Education .01 .05 .01 0.13 
Multiracial -.07 .20 -.02 -0.37 
Race -.04 .04 -.06 -1.20 
Major -.01 .02 -.03 -0.58 
Social Accord -.44 .06 -.42*** -7.94
Potential Loss .09 .06 .07 1.46 
Naïveté Attachment -.17 .05 -.18*** -3.33
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table A.15 
Hierarchical Regression Model of Knowledge Is Simple 
R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 0.18 0.03 
Urban/Rural/Suburban .10 .05 .11* 2.05 
Gender -.02 .09 -.01 -0.18 
Mother Education .07 .05 .08 1.25 
Father Education .01 .05 .01 0.23 
Multiracial .20 .18 .06 1.17 
Race .01 .03 .02 0.43 
Major -.02 .02 .07 -1.21 
Step 2 0.28 0.08** 0.04** 
Urban/Rural/Suburban .09 .05 .10 1.84 
Gender .02 .09 .01 0.17 
Mother Education .09 .05 .11 1.78 
Father Education .02 .05 .02 0.32 
Multiracial .24 .18 .07 1.31 
Race .01 .03 .02 0.29 
Major -.02 .02 -.05 -0.96 
Social Accord -.07 .05 -.09 -1.46 
Potential Loss -.11 .05 -.12* -2.10 
Naïveté Attachment -.10 .05 -.12* -2.06 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table A.16 
Hierarchical Regression Model of Knowledge Is Acquired Quickly 
R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 0.16 0.03 
Urban/Rural/Suburban .03 .04 .04 0.65 
Gender -.02 .08 -.01 -0.26 
Mother Education .04 .05 .05 0.82 
Father Education -.06 .04 -.09 -1.49 
Multiracial .39 .16 .13* 2.47 
Race .02 .03 .04 0.65 
Major -.01 .01 -.03 -0.58 
Step 2 0.27 0.08** 0.05*** 
Urban/Rural/Suburban .02 .04 .03 0.55 
Gender -.01 .08 -.003 -0.06 
Mother Education .04 .05 .05 0.89 
Father Education -.06 .04 -.09 -1.53 
Multiracial .36 .16 .12* 2.31 
Race .01 .03 .02 0.44 
Major .00 .01 -.001 -0.01 
Social Accord -.06 .04 -.08 -1.44 
Potential Loss -.16 .05 -
.19*** 
-3.41 
Naïveté Attachment .004 .04 .01 0.10 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table A.17 
Hierarchical Regression Model of The Capacity for Knowledge Is Innate 
R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 0.16 0.03 
Urban/Rural/Suburban .04 .05 .05 0.83 
Gender -.13 -.10 .07 1.35 
Mother Education -.08 .05 -.09 -1.45 
Father Education -.03 .05 -.04 -0.61 
Multiracial .30 .19 .09 1.60 
Race .02 .03 .03 0.58 
Major .01 .02 .04 0.67 
Step 2 0.24 0.06* 0.03* 
Urban/Rural/Suburban .03 .05 .03 0.55 
Gender -.15 .10 .08 1.53 
Mother Education -.07 .06 -.08 -1.25 
Father Education -.04 .05 -.04 -0.73 
Multiracial .30 .19 .09 1.60 
Race .01 .03 .01 0.22 
Major .02 .02 .05 0.91 
Social Accord -.13 .05 -.15* -2.46 
Potential Loss -.08 .06 -.08 -1.36 
Naïveté Attachment .01 .05 .01 0.14 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Demographic Questionnaire 
D1 What is your current school year level? (if you just finished a grade, claim the next 
semester).  NOTE: If you are younger than 18, you may not complete the survey. 
 High School Senior (1) 
 Not in school but between 18 and 22 years old (2) 
 College Freshman (3) 
 College Sophomore (4) 
 College Junior (5) 
 I am younger than 18 or older than 22 (6) 
D2 City & State. If a student, use home address. 
City: (1) 
State: (2) 
D3 I come from a/an _________________ area. 
 Rural: No city with a population over 50, 000 within 20 miles. (1) 
 Urban: living in a city with a population of 50,000 or more (2) 
 Suburban: near a populated city (50,000 or more) but not within its official limits (3) 
D4 Are you an international student? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
D5 I am 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 Transgender (3) 
 Other (4) 
 I prefer not to answer (5) 
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Appendix B 
D6 Please indicate your parents' highest level of education 
No 
Education 
(1) 
High 
School 
(2) 
College 
Graduate 
(3) 
Master's 
Degree 
(4) 
Doctorate 
(5) 
Click to 
write 
Scale 
point 6 
(6) 
Mother (1)       
Father (2)       
Other 
Guardian
(if 
applicable) 
(3) 
      
Click to 
write 
Statement 
4 (4) 
      
D7 Do you identify as multiracial? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
D8 What is your race? (please mark all that are applicable). 
 African (1) 
 African American/Black (2) 
 American Indian or Alaska Native (3) 
 Asian (4) 
 Asian American (5) 
 European (6) 
 White/Caucasian (7) 
 Latino/Hispanic (8) 
 Pacific Islander (9) 
 Other (10) 
 I prefer not to answer (11) 
 Click to write Choice 12 (12) 
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D9 Below is a list of undergraduate majors grouped into general categories.  Mark only 
one to indicate your probable field of study. 
 Biological Science (1) 
 Business (2) 
 Education (3) 
 Engineering (4) 
 Physical Science (inc. Mathematics (5) 
 Professional (nursing, health tech, pharmacy, phys. therapy) (6) 
 Social Science (7) 
 Technical (8) 
 Other (agriculture, communications, law, military science) (9) 
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Q10 Use the drop-down menu to describe the following categories: 
Race Background Grew up in Religion 
are 
the 
sam
e 
rac
e as 
me 
(1) 
are of 
differe
nt 
races 
(2) 
have the 
same 
economi
c 
backgrou
nd as me 
(1) 
have 
different 
economic 
backgrou
nds from 
me (2) 
the 
sam
e 
tow
n as 
me 
(1) 
are 
from a 
differe
nt 
town 
(2) 
are of 
the 
same 
religi
on as 
me 
(1) 
adhere 
to 
differe
nt 
religio
ns 
than 
me (2) 
The majority of 
my facebook 
friends (1) 
        
The majority of 
my group of 
friends (2) 
        
My more 
intimate friends 
(ones I spend 
most of my 
time with and 
share more 
personal 
information 
with) (3) 
        
My academic 
environment 
(class student 
composition, 
professors/teac
hers) (4) 
        
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Appendix C 
Epistemological Beliefs Inventory 
1. Most things worth knowing are easy to understand.
2. What is true is a matter of opinion.
3. Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.
4. People should always obey the law.
5. People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth.
6. Absolute moral truth does not exist.
7. Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life.
8. Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in school.
9. If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely end up being
confused. 
10. Too many theories just complicate things.
11. The best ideas are often the most simple.
12. Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.
13. Some people are born with special gifts and talents.
14. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.
15. If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever learn it.
16. Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t.
17. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe.
18. If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them must be wrong.
19. Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority.
20. If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back over it won’t
help. 
21. Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts.
22. The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know.
23. What is true today will be true tomorrow.
24. Smart people are born that way.
25. When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.
26. People shouldn’t question authority.
27. Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.
28. Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s bigger problems.
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Appendix D 
Social Influences Survey 
1. I was/am part of a close knit community where I grew up.
2. I feel threatened when challenged by new people or ideas.
3. My parents have a lot invested in me.
4. If I changed my mind about my beliefs, I’d lose a lot of friends.
5. If I accepted a person of difference, it would cause conflict with my family.
6. I make sure my dating partners have the same beliefs as me.
7. I grew up in a strict environment.
8. Sometimes you have to accept answers from teachers even if you don’t understand
them. 
9. Learning depends most on having a good teacher.
10. I defer to religious leaders when I think about truth.
11. I feel a strong attachment toward my own racial/ethnic group.
12. My parents would be upset with me if I changed my mind about beliefs.
13. I rarely have doubts about my lifestyle or beliefs.
14. As a result of my experiences travelling in other cultures, I adjusted my beliefs.
15. My parents were/are heavily involved in my college decision.
16. When I have doubts about my beliefs or lifestyle, I talk to people at home about
them. 
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